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SUPER-STATUTORY CONTRACTING
Kristelia García
Abstract: The conventional wisdom is that property rules induce more—and more
efficient—contracting, and that when faced with rigid property rules, intellectual property
owners will contract into more flexible liability rules. A series of recent, private copyright
deals show some intellectual property owners doing just the opposite: faced with statutory
liability rules, they are contracting for more protection than that dictated by law, something
this Article calls “super-statutory contracting”—either by opting for a stronger, more tailored
liability rule, or by contracting into property rule protection. Through a series of deal analyses,
this Article explores this counterintuitive phenomenon, and updates seminal thinking on
property entitlements and private ordering in the intellectual property context.
While law and economics scholars have long grappled with the question of whether and
when property rules or liability rules are preferable, they have traditionally ignored a key lever:
“perceived control,” or a rights holder’s impression of their ability to grant or withhold
permission to use their work, and/or to name their price for such use. In addition to proposing
a recalibration of the relative importance of consolidation, transaction costs, defaults, and
damages, this Article identifies and describes perceived control as an essential factor in the
licensing enterprise. This has significant implications for legislators and policymakers seeking
to better align incentives between licensors and licensees, and for administrators tasked with
term and rate setting.
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INTRODUCTION
In his influential article on collective rights organizations, Rob Merges
concluded that when faced with stringent property rules, intellectual
property (IP) owners will contract into more tractable liability rules.1 A
series of recent, private copyright deals show IP owners doing just the
opposite: faced with statutory liability rules, they are contracting for more
protection than that dictated by law, a phenomenon this Article calls
“super-statutory contracting”—either by opting for a stronger liability
rule, or by contracting into property rule protection.2 This Article
explores why.
In many ways, intellectual property functions as the name suggests—
like a property regime, operating under a series of property rules that
afford IP owners a qualified right to exclude others from use of their

1. Specifically, via formation of collective rights organizations (CROs). See Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
2. Private parties cannot technically create legal rules; in other words, they can adopt property-like
terms, but cannot obligate a court to grant the quintessential property remedy (an injunction). For this
reason, I use the term “property rule protection” throughout this Article to refer to property rule-like
protection.
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property.3 One defining characteristic of property (as that term is used
herein) is that its use by someone other than its owner requires prior
permission and ex ante negotiation of terms. In the case of copyright,
section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter, the Copyright Act),
outlines the principal property rights of a copyright owner, including,
among other things, the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, and
publicly perform a copyrighted work.4
Notwithstanding this property right baseline, intellectual property
law—and copyright law in particular—have become increasingly
regulatory in practice.5 A regulatory regime can be characterized by its
use of liability rules. In contrast to a property regime, a liability regime
allows for use of another’s property without permission, and with ex post
payment. This move away from traditional property rules and toward a
regime of liability rules is reflected throughout the current copyright
statute: The Copyright Act contains six explicit compulsory licenses
covering everything from cable transmissions to the public performance
of sound recordings.6 These statutory licenses permit use of a copyrighted
work under specified circumstances without permission of the copyright
owner. The statutory rates for these uses are set by the Copyright Royalty
Board (the CRB), a panel of three administrative judges appointed by the
Librarian of Congress.7
Other statutory sections of the Copyright Act also resonate in a liability

3. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (“[W]e hold that the ‘right
to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this
category of interests [that the government must pay to take].”); see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(2005) (examining the natural law justifications for copyright as property); Adam Mossoff, Is
Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005) (making a Lockean argument for treating
copyright as property).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6).
5. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 91–92 (2004) (describing
regulation as “the dominant mode of copyright lawmaking”); Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn
in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 115 (2013) (observing a “turn in IP . . . towards a regulatory
state”); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63,
194–97 (2002) (describing copyright’s shift from property regime to regulatory regime). But see BJ
Ard, More Property Rules than Property? The Right to Exclude in Patent and Copyright, 68 EMORY
L.J. 685 (2019) (suggesting property rules are more prevalent in IP than in property law).
6. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114 (establishing compulsory licenses for cable transmissions and
the public performance of sound recordings, respectively). The other statutory licenses are included
in sections 112 (ephemeral recordings); 115 (making and distributing phonorecords; note, the Music
Modernization Act (MMA), effective 2021, makes significant changes to, but does not eliminate, the
section 115 compulsory license); 119 (secondary transmissions for satellite carriers); and 122
(secondary transmissions by satellite carriers for local retransmissions).
7. Id. § 801.
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rule approach8: For example, section 109 allows a lawful owner to sell,
lease, or lend a copyrighted work without permission of the copyright
holder.9 Section 107 outlines several categories of use in which a
copyrighted work may be used without permission.10 Section 110 exempts
certain performances and displays of copyrighted material from
infringement, again without permission from the copyright owner.11
In contrast, private ordering in the copyright space has followed a
surprising trajectory in the opposite direction, toward super-statutory
terms and protections. The debate over the desirability of property rules
versus liability rules has a long and illustrious history in the literature.12
So too does the application of property rules and liability rules in the
intellectual property context. Starting with the canonical work of Guido
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed—in which they coined the terms
“property rules” and “liability rules” as used herein13—and continuing
with IP-specific application by Robert Merges,14 Phil Weiser, Mark
Lemley,15 and others—transaction costs play a central role in the debate
over which regime is more efficient in a particular context.
In his seminal work on the subject, Merges describes how the granting
8. The statutory exceptions listed in this paragraph can all be said to have an implicit price of zero.
There is some debate—orthogonal to the argument made herein—regarding whether anything that is
not a property rule (i.e., anything that does not deter a taking) is a liability rule, or whether, in order
to qualify as a liability rule, an owner must be compensated for the taking. My use herein is the former.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
10. Id. § 107. Some commentators have suggested that these exceptions, commonly referred to as
the fair use doctrine, can be thought of as a statutory license with a set price of zero. See, e.g., Trotter
Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 233 (“Fair use . . . can
be seen as a kind of compulsory license—albeit one for which the payment required is exactly
zero dollars.”).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 110.
12. There exists in the literature an ongoing tension between property scholars, on the one hand,
and law and economics scholars on the other hand, over the lack of continuity between the idea of
property qua property, and property rules. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) (lamenting the demise of
in rem property in favor of an in personam view made popular by the law and economics literature).
While law and economics scholars tend to conflate the terms, property scholars generally maintain
that the fact that a thing is protected by a property rule doesn’t necessarily mean that the underlying
thing is a property right. For example, specific performance is a property rule, but “specific
performance” does not constitute property. In other words, property rules build on—but are distinct
from—property rights, and the term “property rules” is primarily reserved for discussion of remedies.
This distinction is well-taken, but is also orthogonal to my principal claim, for which purpose I adopt
the law and economics approach, and herein use the terms “property,” “property regime,” and
“property rules” more or less interchangeably.
13. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
14. See Merges, supra note 1.
15. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?,
85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007).
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of strong property rights in intellectual property may lead stakeholders to
voluntarily enter into liability rights regimes in the form of collective
rights organizations.16 This in turn minimizes transaction costs by
consolidating content, and with it, bargaining power.17 In a subsequent
piece, Mark Lemley showed that while “parties can contract around
inefficient property rules in IP cases . . . they can—and do—contract
around inefficient liability rules as well.”18 The case analyses in this
Article confirm this observation, and offer insight as to both the impetus
for, and the result of, such contracting.
In their work on legal entitlements, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley challenge
the convention that property rules always lead to more (and more
efficient) contracting, arguing that where transaction costs are positive—
but not prohibitive—poorly-tailored liability rules may actually
encourage more bargaining.19 The reason, they suggest, lies in liability
rules’ “information-forcing” quality; i.e., “liability rules may actually
facilitate trade by reducing the effective amount of private information.”20
This Article describes a trend that runs counter to the received wisdom on
property versus liability rules in intellectual property, and supports the
theory advanced by Ayres and Talley; namely, that a default of
poorly-tailored liability rules can lead to more (and more
efficient) contracting.
To demonstrate this proposition, this Article presents a series of recent,
voluntary copyright agreements that opt for a stronger liability rule, or for
property rule protection, despite the existence of a statutory liability rule
default. This is interesting for a number of reasons, not least of all because
the conventional justification for compulsory licensing is that it lowers
transaction costs (many of which result from asymmetrical information)
and alleviates potential bottlenecks. The interesting twist—and this
Article’s primary contribution—is that this private ordering tends to result
in more protection than that dictated by statute. This Article proposes that
the impetus for this shift is a transfer of perceived control to the party who
values it most.
The tendency toward super-statutory contracting in copyright—a
regime based largely on liability rules—counters the conventional
wisdom that property rules induce more (and more efficient) contracting
by showing that liability rights can prompt stakeholders to voluntarily
16. See Merges, supra note 1, at 1296.
17. Id. at 1294.
18. Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 464 (2012).
19. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1033 (1995).
20. Id. at 1036–38 (emphasis in original).
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enter into agreements with property right protections.21 This signifies a
counterintuitive relinquishment of licensees’ rights in order to put more
perceived control into the hands of licensors.
The analysis of this phenomenon proceeds as follows: Part I offers an
overview of the literature on property rules and liability rules, and their
intersection with intellectual property. Part II outlines both the property
rule and liability rule features of the current copyright regime. Part III
describes a series of recent, private copyright deals in order to demonstrate
how each marks an explicit move away from liability rules and toward
property rules. Part IV discusses the implications of this counterintuitive
shift. The Article concludes with thoughts on the future of public law and
private ordering in copyright, and a call for appreciation of the central role
that perceived control plays in licensing negotiations.
I.

THEORY

The scholarly thought around property rules and liability rules, and
their application to intellectual property, is perhaps best understood
through the lens of transaction costs. Beginning with Coase and a world
with perfect bargaining, this Part traces the theoretical evolution by
varying level of transaction costs, then considers the intersection with
intellectual property.
A.

Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Transaction Costs

A natural starting point for the discussion of property and liability rules,
the Coase Theorem holds that in a world with no transaction costs,
property will go to its highest and best use through private negotiation,
such that it doesn’t matter who is granted the entitlement initially.22
Coase’s seminal example describes a farmer and a rancher and a single
plot of land in a world in which either the farmer can plant their crops or
the rancher can graze their cattle, but not both.23 In the absence of
transaction costs, Coase posits that it doesn’t matter which party is given
the initial entitlement to the land; whichever party values the use most will

21. This temporal shift from a (public) liability rule to a (private) property rule arguably exemplifies
the concept of a dynamic property entitlement known as a “pliability rule.” See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (defining pliability rules as
“contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with property rule or liability rule protection as
long as some specified condition obtains; however, once the relevant condition changes, a different
rule protects the entitlement—either liability or property, as the circumstances dictate. Pliability rules,
in other words, are dynamic rules . . . .”).
22. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
23. Id. at 2.
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simply pay the other party for exclusive use of the land and everyone will
be better off. The end result—and Coase’s goal for property distribution—
is that the property will be put to its highest and best use.
Of course, a world with no transaction costs is “a very unrealistic
assumption,” as Coase himself recognizes.24 Sometimes, “the cost of
establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great
that even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned,
such a transfer will not occur.”25 In the real world, parties incur expenses
associated with determining who holds an entitlement and figuring out
how to contact that person, followed by the engagement of a lawyer and
perhaps a land surveyor, a title search, etc. The level of transaction costs
varies from transaction to transaction, and impacts the relative desirability
of property rules versus liability rules when it comes to ensuring
completion of a transaction that will put the property to its highest and
best use.
In their seminal work, Calabresi and Melamed articulate three rules for
governing entitlements: property rules, liability rules, and inalienability
rules.26 Each of these regimes involves some level of state intervention
when it comes to enforcement, but the level of such intervention varies
from regime to regime.
Calabresi and Melamed describe property rules as requiring that
“someone who wishes to remove [an] entitlement from its holder must
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller . . . the state does not try to decide
its value.”27 According to Calabresi and Melamed, property rules require
the least amount of state intervention because once the original
entitlement is bestowed, the state’s role is done.28 It’s all private ordering
from that point forward.
Liability rules, on the other hand, govern “[w]henever someone may
destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively
determined value for it.”29 Liability rules require more state intervention
than property rules because the state must not only bestow the original
entitlement, but then must also engage in value-determination.30 In other
24. Id. at 15.
25. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1106.
26. Id. at 1089.
27. Id. at 1092 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. The third rule for governing entitlements, inalienability, is implicated where “transfer is not
permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” Id. Entitlements governed by inalienability
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words:
[M]uch of what is generally called private property can be viewed
as an entitlement which is protected by a property rule. No one
can take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless
the holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he
subjectively values the property. Yet a nuisance with sufficient
public utility to avoid injunction has, in effect, the right to take
property with compensation. In such a circumstance the
entitlement to the property is protected only by what we call a
liability rule: an external, objective standard of value is used to
facilitate the transfer of the entitlement from the holder to
the nuisance.31
Calabresi and Melamed explain the shift from a default of property
rules to the adoption of liability rules as owing to economic efficiency;
namely, the reduction (or, in some cases, elimination) of transaction
costs.32 In other words, liability rules can help efficient transfers happen
where prohibitively high transaction costs might otherwise prevent them.
Recent scholarship has served to further advance the idea that strong
property rights are not a prerequisite for efficient exchange.33
In practice, most markets operate somewhere between Coase’s world
with no transaction costs and Calabresi and Melamed’s world of
prohibitive transaction costs. In this economic purgatory—where
transaction costs are positive but not prohibitive—conventional wisdom
holds that property rules are preferable when transaction costs are low,
presumably because those costs can be more readily overcome and
bargaining can ensue. Property rules are also understood to encourage
bargaining because their existence puts parties on notice that they need to
do so.34 Conversely, as transaction costs increase, liability rules are
rules—including such things as law licenses and kidneys—are not relevant for the purposes of
this Article.
31. Id. at 1105–06.
32. See id. at 1127 (acknowledging the potential for distributional reasons as well, though these
seem to play a smaller and less frequent role, particularly in the IP context).
33. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Nicola Persico, Exchange Efficiency with Weak Ownership Rights,
8 AM. ECON. J. 230, 253 (2016) (arguing that whether property rules have an efficiency advantage
when transaction costs are positive is “far from clear”); Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Who
Owns What? Re-Thinking Remedies in Private Law 14 (Jan. 17, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (suggesting that “weak property rights sometimes are more efficient than
strong ones”).
34. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that
“[in settings with low transaction costs], the law should require the parties to transact in the market;
it can do this by making the present owner’s property right absolute (or nearly so), so that anyone
who thinks the property is worth more has to negotiate with the owner”); Richard Craswell, Property
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preferable as a means of overcoming transaction costs and allowing for
completion of a transaction that might otherwise not take place.35
From an efficiency standpoint, one of the most significant transaction
costs is private information. Each side knows their own valuation of the
property in question, but not that of the other party. In their work on the
division of legal entitlements to property, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley
challenge the conventional wisdom by proposing that liability rules—due
to their “information-forcing” quality—may induce both more, and more
efficient, contracting than property rules.36 Thus, instead of viewing
liability rules in their traditional role of “market-mimicking,” Ayres and
Talley propose a conception of liability rules as “market catalysts,”37 a
role conventionally assigned to property rules.
Importantly, their analysis specifically contemplates untailored
liability rules—i.e., rules under which the licensee pays a fixed amount
upon use of the property, notwithstanding the property owner’s actual
valuation. Where an entitlement is protected by an untailored liability rule,
they argue, the property owner is encouraged to reveal private information
regarding the property’s value by either (i) bribing the prospective user
not to take advantage of the liability rule; or by (ii) offering the property
at some price less than the statutory amount. Property owners who opt to
bribe signal a valuation above the statutory rate, while property owners
who choose to offer signal a valuation below the statutory rate.38
Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–15
(1993) (applying the conventional view in the contract context).
35. See Craswell, supra note 34, at 1–15. But cf. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Essay,
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 455
(1995) (questioning the conventional wisdom, and determining that “when (a) assessment costs
promote inaccurate damage awards by the judge, and (b) bargaining between the parties is at the same
time impeded by transaction costs, there is no a priori basis for favoring liability rules over property
rules. If (a) and (b) are the real-world conditions—and we think they regularly are—then the
conventional preference for liability rules makes no sense.”). For a comprehensive analysis of the
Krier-Schwab take on Calebresi-Melamed, see Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1997).
36. Ayres & Talley, supra note 19, at 1032.
37. Id. at 1033.
38. Id. at 1038. In a published response to Ayres and Talley, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell take
issue with the characterization of liability rules as superior to property rules when it comes to
facilitating bargaining. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A
Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 233 (1995). They note, for example, that parties may
behave strategically to misrepresent their valuations. Id. at 233. Specifically, they argue that
bargaining transacted under property rules leads to a greater increase in welfare, while gains from
bargaining transacted under liability rules amount to mere wealth transfer. Id. at 229–30. In their
reply, Ayres and Talley explain the divergence in view as a matter of consensual versus
nonconsensual advantage. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and
Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995). While all parties
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Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Transaction Costs in the
Intellectual Property Context

Information-forcing isn’t the only justification for liability rules. In
their work on the protection of information, Mark Lemley and Phil Weiser
suggest that property rules are only useful if their remedy—namely,
injunctive relief—can be effectively enforced.39 “In the case of many
technology markets, the inability to tailor injunctive relief so that it
protects only the underlying right rather than also enjoining noninfringing
conduct provides a powerful basis for using a liability rule instead of a
property rule.”40 Despite this endorsement, liability rules present unique
challenges in the intellectual property context, as the rest of this
section outlines.
The trouble with liability rules, as Calabresi and Melamed
acknowledge, is the potential for the collectively-determined value to
result in over- or under-compensation.41 In other words, liability rules are
presumed efficient only where the rate-setting body has complete
information; this is rarely the case.42 The problem of incomplete
information is especially acute—or at least especially acutely complained
about—in the IP context, where the establishment of liability rules has
often occurred simultaneously with the establishment of a new market
such that there is no opportunity for a true market rate to emerge.
The ongoing battle over the licensing of public performance rights is
illustrative of this point. As of this writing, the rate for public performance
royalties for musical compositions is set by performing rights
organizations (PROs) such as the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), both
of which are currently governed by consent decree.43 By definition, a
acknowledge a nonconsensual advantage, or “head start,” afforded liability rules, Ayres and Talley
maintain that other factors in the bargaining process play just as important (and possibly more
important) a role, such that this advantage does not negate their thesis. Id. at 237–38.
39. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 15, at 784.
40. Id.
41. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1108 (noting that in many cases “it is so hard to
determine . . . true valuation” that a statute may simply assign an objective value “in the full
knowledge that this may result in over or under compensation”). In his work on the structure of legal
entitlements, Ian Ayres proposes several new types of liability rules that aim to reduce the risk of
over- and under-compensation. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL
ENTITLEMENTS 39–100 (2005).
42. Kaplow and Shavell note that so long as the estimate is unbiased, liability rules can still be more
efficient than property protection, notwithstanding incomplete information. See Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 38.
43. ASCAP’s original consent decree is United States v. ASCAP, [1940–1943] Trade Cas. (CCH)
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market rate is determined in a market. Because of the existence of the
consent decrees—which act like liability rules in dictating ex ante the
terms and conditions under which licensing can take place—there is no
market (in the economic sense) for the licensing of public performance
rights. There never has been a market, and there can’t be one unless and
until the consent decrees are revoked in their entirety (an unlikely, and
arguably undesirable, scenario).
This means that we don’t know what the market rate is, or should be,
for public performance royalties for musical compositions. To illustrate,
consider the following series of events, both of which happened within
months of each other during 2012–2013: First, music publishers
Sony/ATV and UMPG withdrew their digital (but not analog) public
performance rights from ASCAP, at which point the publishers
approached internet radio service Pandora and privately “negotiated” an
alleged “market rate” nearly double ASCAP’s going rate.44 If Pandora is
to be believed, this rate was supra-competitive, and was obtained via
thinly-veiled threat and coercion.45 When music publisher BMG Chrysalis
attempted the same withdraw-and-negotiate maneuver, Pandora removed
BMG’s content from its service until a much lower rate was agreed upon.
If BMG is to be believed, this rate was sub-market, and was obtained via
starve-out tactics on behalf of Pandora.46
So which account is accurate? Since we don’t have a market rate for
public performance rights, we don’t know if we have a supra-competitive
rate, or a sub-market rate. The only way to eventually determine a market
rate for public performance royalties is to do away with the consent
decrees entirely—a decision which presents a number of concerns,
including the potential to deny direct payments to artists, and the potential
for powerful publishing companies to block entry of new streaming
services.47 Moreover, the incentive theory of copyright suggests that we
grant creators a “monopoly” over their work in order to encourage more

¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). BMI’s is United States v. BMI, [1940–1943] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,096
(E.D. Wis. 1941).
44. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331, 348–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015).
45. Ed Christman, Pandora and BMI Wrap Up Arguments, Await a Big Decision, BILLBOARD
(Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6502302/bmi-rate-court-argumentsclose [https://perma.cc/4YR8-4B8N].
46. Ed Christman, Pandora v. BMI’s Court Battle Reveals Long-Term Strategies, Licensing Aims,
BILLBOARD (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/
6473036/pandora-vs-bmis-court-battle-reveals-long-term [https://perma.cc/Z8G4-MPXG].
47. See Ed Christman, Dept. of Justice Considering Major Overhauls on Consent Decrees, Sources
Say, BILLBOARD (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6524359/dept-ofjustice-consent-decrees-overhaul-publishing-ascap-bmi [https://perma.cc/4RV9-RGNL].
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(not necessarily “better”) creation.48 Despite centuries of debate, we still
don’t know what the “right” level of incentivization is.49
This example from the world of music publishing illustrates the special
challenge to liability rules in IP: they are particularly subjective and
poorly-tailored. While Calabresi and Melamed use examples of pollution
and criminal sanctions to support their framework, later work has applied
their theory in the IP context. Most notably, Merges’s influential work on
collective rights organizations concludes that in the IP context, property
rules are preferable to liability rules because the strong protections
afforded by a property regime will enable the formation of institutions—
namely, collective rights organizations—that effectively operate like a
liability regime: “property rule entitlements drive IPR [intellectual
property rights] holders in high transaction industries into repeat-play
bargaining which leads to the formation of CROs.”50 These CROs are
superior to compulsory licensing, he suggests, because “[i]n a CRO,
knowledgeable industry participants set the rules of exchange. These rules
are not likely to be uniform, one-size-fits-all terms as in a statutory
compulsory license . . . .”51
In the same piece, Merges rejects Ayres and Talley’s conclusion (that
liability rules may lead to more bargaining than property rules) in the IP
context, calling IP “different,” and noting that, unlike the examples in
their work, “[i]t would be extremely difficult in most cases for an
intellectual property right holder to identify all potential infringers” and
that “[o]nce word got out that people were being paid not to infringe a
right, the number of people who suddenly showed an interest in infringing
(and who therefore needed to be bought out in advance by the right holder)
would skyrocket.”52 He also worries that “a liability rule in the intellectual
property context will tend to act as a ceiling on valuation, allowing only
for bargaining rule downward from the liability. . . . The state in effect
sets the top entitlement price.”53 In other words, his concern is that liability
rules may systematically undercompensate copyright owners. This is
arguably true, although perhaps less uniquely concerning where—as is

48. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
49. See, e.g., Kristelia A. García & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term, 71
ALA. L. REV. 351, 405–06 (2019) (suggesting that copyright’s term is not nearly as important as the
strength and timing of protections).
50. Merges, supra note 1, at 1296.
51. Id. at 1295.
52. Id. at 1305.
53. Id.
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often the case in IP—the liability rule may be circumvented.
In other work, Merges notes a “strong preference for injunctions—the
classic instance of a property rule—in IPR law” as further support for a
property rule preference in the IP context.54 He also suggests that property
rules are particularly well-suited “where unique assets [as he asserts IP is]
are exchanged.”55
The examples presented in Part III below confirm Merges’s preference
for strong property rights in IP, but challenge his faith in collective rights
organizations’ ability to best represent rights holders’ interests. As the
examples demonstrate, prospective licensors and licensees in the
copyright space no longer feel the need to negotiate blanket terms, but
instead are now willing to strike one-off deals, and with terms that often
extend more rights than the relevant statutory section requires. So what
has changed? Among other things, Part III will show that lower
transaction costs and a loss of faith in CROs’ ability to achieve the best
rate has worked to erode licensors’ and licensees’ former affinity for
liability rules. But first, the next Part will discuss copyright law’s
increasingly regulatory nature.
II.

PUBLIC COPYRIGHT LAW: A REGULATORY REGIME

As a form of intellectual property, copyright law is rooted in property
principles. Section A outlines the primary sources of statutory property
right entitlements in copyright. The last few decades have seen copyright
take an increasingly regulatory turn. Section B discusses copyright law’s
shift toward a liability rule regime.
A.

Property Rules in Copyright

Section 106 of the Copyright Act lays out the exclusive property rights
afforded a copyright owner; namely, the right to make and distribute
copies, the right to make derivative works, and the right to publicly
perform and display a work, including (in the case of sound recordings)
public digital performance.56 Section 106(A), added to the Copyright Act
by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), is applicable only to
visual works of art—such as paintings and sculptures—and adds two
additional property rights: the right of attribution—or the right to claim

54. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2655, 2655 (1994).
55. Id. at 2656, 2665–67 (referencing A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The
Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980)).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6).
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authorship of a work (as well as the inverse right to remain anonymous)—
and the right of integrity, which bars intentional mutilation or distortion
of a work deemed to be “of recognized stature.”57
Collectively, the rights enumerated in sections 106 and 106(A) form
the basis for the consideration of copyright law as a property regime. In
his work on the justifications for copyright, Richard Epstein has suggested
that this position also finds support in natural law theory.58 Adam Mossoff
has likewise argued for copyright as property regime under a
Lockean framework:
As Representative Gulian Verplanck stated in defense of a bill
that became the Copyright Act of 1831: “[T]he work of an author
was the result of his own labor. It was a right of property existing
before the law of copyrights had been made.” State laws
protecting intellectual property rights prior to the 1787 Federal
Convention also reflected a Lockean influence. New Hampshire,
to name but one example, enacted legislation to protect copyrights
and other forms of intellectual property because “there being no
property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced
by the labour of his mind.” Moreover, the evolution and creation
of new types of intellectual property rights in the nineteenth
century, such as trademarks and trade secrets, followed the
contours of a labor theory of property. The initial definition and
protection of trade secrets as property entitlements, for instance,
derived its justification from the courts’ belief that such rights
were similar to other property rights born of valuable labor and
already protected by the law.59

57. Id. § 106(A)(a)(3)(B) (stating that the author of a work of visual art shall have the right “to
prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent
destruction of that work is a violation of that right”). The scant case law on the topic has established
the following two-part test for whether a work should be deemed “of recognized stature” for VARA
purposes: “(1) that the visual art in question has ‘stature,’ i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that
this stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some
cross-section of society.” Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
58. See Epstein, supra note 3; cf. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent
Law, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 4
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (“[C]opyright . . . protection contradicts Locke’s
justification of property. By invoking state power, a copyright . . . owner can impose prior restraint,
fines, imprisonment, and confiscation on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet
enjoyment of their tangible property.”).
59. Mossoff, supra note 3, at 36 (footnotes omitted); cf. Jessica Litman, What We Don’t See When
We See Copyright as Property, 77 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 536, 536–58 (2018) (noting that labeling
copyright a freely alienable property right might exacerbate extant inequalities in both wealth and
bargaining power).
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The availability of an injunction60—an equitable remedy—in the event
of a finding of copyright infringement also points to a traditional property
right interpretation of a copyright owner’s rights. There is also an entire
body of state-specific law—common law copyright—that operates under
traditional property rules.61 Common law copyright is a regime of state
laws that cover works outside of federal copyright law’s purview; for
example, sound recordings fixed before 1972.62 Notwithstanding its
property law origins, contemporary copyright law has assumed a
distinctively regulatory flavor, as the next section details.
B.

Liability Rules in Copyright

The public law of copyright began its trajectory toward liability rules
with the Copyright Act of 1909 (the predecessor to our current regime),
which introduced the compulsory cover license and the first sale doctrine,
among others.63 The current Copyright Act has continued the move
toward regulatory copyright by introducing additional compulsory
licenses, sometimes referred to as liability “call options.”64 These licenses
include certain uses of cable television retransmissions,65 digital audio
transmissions,66 musical compositions,67 public performances by

60. 17 U.S.C. § 502.
61. To be sure, federal preemption has not left much to the states, with one important exception:
pre-1978 sound recordings. Prior to February 15, 1972, federal copyright did not protect sound
recordings, though some state laws did. The passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 brought sound
recordings into the fold, but only those recorded on or after January 1, 1978. Sound recordings
recorded prior to that date remain the subject of state law. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS 6 (2019), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XU33-ZWEZ].
62. These works are explicitly excluded from federal protection by 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). For more
on the oft-neglected world of common law intellectual property, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The
Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010).
63. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); see also, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations & Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 12, 18 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017) (“The 1909 Act had three L&E
[limitation & exception] provisions. One was a codification of the exhaustion doctrine. A second
limited the newly created right of composers to control mechanical reproductions of their music in
sound recordings by subjecting their works to a compulsory license. Once a copyrighted song had
been recorded once, anyone could re-record the song as long as they paid the license fee set forth in
the statute.” (citations omitted)).
64. For a fuller description of, and history behind, the call-option reconceptualization of liability
rules, see AYRES, supra note 41, at 13–15.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 111.
66. Id. § 114.
67. Id. § 115.
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jukebox,68 public broadcast,69 and satellite transmission.70 The statutory
rates and terms for these licenses are set (and adjusted at five-year
intervals) by statute, a task delegated by the Librarian of Congress (LoC)
to the Copyright Royalty Board—a body of three appointed judges who
serve staggered six-year terms—with input from interested parties.71
Challenges to the statutory rate can be made through the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) in its capacity as
rate court.72
Where an absolute right to exclude typically characterizes a property
regime,73 liability regimes are more likely to feature various permissions
and exemptions. Consistent with this approach, the Copyright Act
includes a series of exceptions to a finding of infringement. These include
fair uses,74 the first sale doctrine,75 reproduction by libraries and
archives,76 and certain public performances and displays (mostly
educational).77
Prior work has also suggested that the existence, and recent
proliferation, of copyright arbitrage further supports recognition of
copyright as a regulatory regime.78 Other scholars have made similar
observations with regard to copyright’s propensity toward liability rules.
In his work on the impact of digital technologies on copyright law, Peter
Menell describes increasingly polarized positions on the expansion or
contraction of copyright protections as leading Congress to “delegate[]
resolution of the problem to a regulatory agency.”79
In his work on the subject of regulation in IP, Mark Lemley writes that
68. Id. § 116.
69. Id. § 118.
70. Id. § 119.
71. See id. §§ 801(b)(1), 804(b)(4). A typical CRB ratemaking for phonorecords involves the filing
of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from both copyright owners and platforms. See
George Johnson’s (GEO) Proposed Conclusions of Law and Findings of Fact, In re Determination of
Royalty Rates & Terms for Making & Distrib. Phonorecords (Phonorecords III),
No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (Copyright Royalty Bd. May 12, 2017).
72. The Music Modernization Act (MMA), H.R. 5447, 115th Cong. (2018), introduces a new
“wheel” approach to the assignment of SDNY judges as rate court arbiters. Under the “wheel”
approach, judges are assigned randomly for each rate, instead of assigning all rate disputes to the same
judge. 28 U.S.C. § 137(b).
73. There are, of course, exceptions: necessity, adverse possession, and antidiscrimination laws,
among others.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
75. Id. § 109.
76. Id. § 108.
77. Id. § 110.
78. Kristelia A. García, Copyright Arbitrage, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 199 (2019).
79. Menell, supra note 5, at 195.
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“[l]arge swathes of the Copyright Act really are regulation: regulating
price, setting compulsory licenses, determining what can be done, etc.”80
Tim Wu has described copyright as a little bit of both: “The first regime
is the familiar system, run by the courts, that grants exclusive [property]
rights to encourage creativity. The second is a messier regulatory regime
comprised mainly of the sections of copyright that have always perplexed
copyright theorists and have never fit the central theme of
author incentives.”81
Joseph Liu describes copyright’s increasingly regulatory character as
stemming from a willingness of Congress to intervene in the structure of
copyright markets.82 He notes that:
The 1976 Act departed from the pure property rights view by
introducing detailed, industry-specific exemptions and several
complex compulsory licenses for certain industries. The Librarian
of Congress was, for the first time, charged not only with
registering copyrights, but also setting licensing rates, albeit in
only a few industries. Since the 1976 Act, amendments to the Act
have become increasingly more detailed and industry-specific,
relying more on compulsory licenses and, in some cases,
mandating adoption of certain technologies and banning others.
The Librarian of Congress’s duties have similarly expanded
beyond mere registration, encompassing not only ratemaking but
also substantive rulemaking. Recently proposed legislation, as
well as academic proposals for significantly revamping the
copyright system, also exhibit similar qualities. The trend is such
that this mode of “regulatory copyright” is now the dominant
mode of copyright lawmaking.83
The most recent copyright legislation—the Music Modernization Act84
(the MMA)—is also regulatory in nature. It replaces the existing
section 115 statutory cover license with another compulsory license. The
new, alternative “blanket license” allows a digital music provider to
obtain a compulsory license for any “covered activities,”85 defined as
“making a digital phonorecord delivery of a musical work, including in
the form of a permanent download, limited download, or
interactive stream.”86
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Lemley, supra note 5, at 110–11.
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 (2004).
Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 91 (2004) (citations omitted).
Id. at 91–92.
H.R. 5447, 115th Cong. (2018). The Act will take effect in 2021.
17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(1).
Id. § 115(e)(7).
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III. PRIVATE COPYRIGHT LAW: SUPER-STATUTORY
CONTRACTING
Notwithstanding the public law’s marked shift toward liability rules,
the private law of copyright has taken a different tact, with parties opting
out of copyright’s liability regime in favor of super-statutory contracting.
On the one hand, this is surprising given the conventional preference for
liability rules in fields—like copyright—where transaction costs are
typically understood to be prohibitive. On the other hand, the
one-size-fits-all nature of copyright’s compulsory licenses make them
quintessential examples of the untailored liability rules that Ayres and
Talley tell us should lead to more (and more efficient) contracting.87
This Part tests Ayres’s and Talley’s theory in a series of recent private
copyright agreements split into two categories: section A presents
voluntary agreements that exceed statutory obligations. Section B
describes private deals that explicitly reject a collective rights
organization. For each example, I describe both how the deal represents a
move away from the extant liability regime and toward super-statutory
contracting, and discuss both the improvements in efficiency and concerns
raised. Section C observes a split between the two deal types that aligns
with the Coasean bargaining categories described by Ayres and Talley.88
Finally, section D offers some factors predictive of super-statutory
contracting in the shadow of liability rules in copyright.
A.

Voluntary Agreements that Exceed Statutory Obligations

1.

Content ID

Among other things, YouTube, the world’s largest content delivery
platform, hosts content uploaded by users. This user-generated content
(UGC) has the potential to, and sometimes does, infringe rights holders’
copyrights. In the absence of some form of protection, the secondary
liability for YouTube would be crushing.89 The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 199890 (the DMCA) attempted to address this with the
addition of section 512 to the Copyright Act. Section 512(c) limits the
liability of online service providers (OSPs) like YouTube so long as they
comply with certain requirements commonly referred to as “notice
87. See discussion supra section II.B.
88. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 19, at 1038–42.
89. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (discussing the need for the safe harbor in order to
“ensure[ ] that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality
of services on the Internet will continue to expand”).
90. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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and takedown.”91
So long as OSPs like YouTube comply with notice and takedown
requirements, users can continue uploading infringing content, and rights
holders cannot sue YouTube. In this way, section 512(c) can be said to act
like a (limited time, zero-price) liability rule, effectively allowing the
platform to use the rights holders’ property without permission, so long
as they remove it when asked. As with all liability regimes, transaction
costs—in this case, the cost of litigation and potential cost of statutory
damages—are initially greatly reduced. Over time, however, these
savings have faded in the face of an ever-increasing number of notices—
the latest Transparency Report from Google, YouTube’s parent company,
reports over four billion takedown notices received from over 226,600
unique copyright owners92—and the concomitant need to hire entire teams
of people to handle the takedown process.
In 2006, YouTube began working on a private solution called Content
ID.93 By 2007, Content ID—a proprietary, voluntary agreement between
YouTube and a select group of content owners—was up and running.94
When a user attempts to upload a video to YouTube, Content ID
temporarily blocks the upload while it compares the content to a database
of copyrighted works supplied by participating copyright owners who can
then elect to either deny the upload, or to allow the upload and then
“claim,” or monetize, the advertising revenues associated with it.95
This private agreement does several interesting things: First, in
allowing a rights holder to block a user’s upload, Content ID extends
copyright owners a right to exclude—that quintessential feature of
property right regimes—that is not contemplated by section 512(c). In
addition, Content ID adds a monetization option—again, with no such
allowance or obligation imposed by the governing statute.96 In other
words, Content ID establishes two remedies: (1) an effective injunction (a
91. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
92. Content Delistings Due to Copyright, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/
copyright/overview?hl=en (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (tally updated continually). This is the total
with Content ID in place since 2007!
93. History of Content Management, YOUTUBE5YEAR, https://www.sites.google.com/a/
pressatgoogle.com/youtube5year/home/history-of-copyright [https://perma.cc/S4H2-PHQ8].
94. Id.
95. Because monetization is not an option under section 512(c), Content ID is often referred to as
a “DMCA-plus” agreement. See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google
.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/GHA5-QE5J]. The election on the part of the
content owner to deny or to claim an upload happens before the video appears on YouTube. In theory,
this could mean a user is waiting a while to see their post go live, but algorithms like Content ID
largely automate the process making it much faster. For example, most major content owners default
to “monetize ads” and let everything go up automatically.
96. Id.
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traditional property remedy); and (2) a damages equivalent (a traditional
liability remedy). Indeed, the Content ID agreement contemplates greater
protection than provided for in section 512(c), which itself can be thought
of as creating a private injunction via notice-and-takedown.
By its own account, YouTube has spent over $100 million developing
and refining Content ID,97 demonstrating a blatant disregard for the
minimization of transaction costs theoretically offered by section 512’s
liability rule. (Of course, by leaving the content up, the platform increases
monetization—even with profit-sharing.) In shifting the burden for
detection of infringement from the content owner (as it lies under the
statute) to the platform (as it lies under Content ID), we also see an
internalization of externalities that Harold Demsetz associated with the
assignment of property rights.98
There are several things going on here; arguably, they all stem from the
fact that section 512’s notice and takedown process was never particularly
successful at curbing copyright infringement. For example, a recent
quantitative study found that approximately 30% of takedown notices
issued are “potentially problematic.”99 Using a six-month data set, the
researchers found that one out of every twenty-five notices were
“fundamentally flawed,” with 19% of the notices analyzed raising
fundamental questions about whether content owners had accurately
identified the works involved, and about whether they had considered fair
use, as required by Ninth Circuit case law.100 Even fans of takedown
believe the system is broken, with some commentators citing an “endless
game of whack-a-mole” for artists and content owners, and pushing for a
stronger “notice-and-staydown” system.101
97. Paul Sawers, YouTube: We’ve Invested $100 Million in Content ID and Paid Over $3 Billion
to Rightsholders, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 7, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/11/07/youtubeweve-invested-100-million-in-content-id-and-paid-over-3-billion-to-rightsholders/ [https://perma.cc/
LF2J-6CP8]. The decision to invest in Content ID arguably stemmed from the very real threat of
exorbitantly costly litigation from major content owners like Viacom. See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant
& Saul Hansell, Viacom Asks YouTube to Remove Clips, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.
nytimes.com/2007/02/02/technology/02cnd-tube.html [https://perma.cc/MCW4-3QFD] (noting
Viacom’s demand that YouTube remove over 100,000 videos in 2007 alone).
98. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967)
(establishing that “[a] primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a
greater internalization of externalities”).
99. Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday
Practice 2 (UC Berkeley Pub. L. Research Paper, Paper No. 2755628, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 [https://perma.cc/6Y9P-V98A].
100. Id.; see also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding
consideration of fair use required prior to issuance of a takedown notice under section 512).
101. See, e.g., Devin Hartline, Endless Whack-A-Mole: Why Notice-and-Staydown Just Makes
Sense, CPIP BLOG (Jan. 14, 2016), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2016/01/14/endless-whack-a-mole-whynotice-and-staydown-just-makes-sense/ [https://perma.cc/8WQU-SU9V].

Garcia (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 9:55 PM

SUPER-STATUTORY CONTRACTING

1803

At its core, the problem with section 512 is two-fold: First, its “penalty”
(the takedown requirement) does not act upon the infringer (i.e., the user).
When a user uploads an infringing video to YouTube, it falls to YouTube
to accept the notice from the copyright owner, and to effect removal of
the video. The worst that might happen to the user is that YouTube will
terminate their account after a series of infringing uploads, at which point
they can simply create a new user account and repeat. Over time, and
cumulatively, this has led to an incredible quantity of takedown notices.
While not quite as expensive as litigation, perhaps, the constitution and
maintenance of dedicated “takedown departments” is far from costless—
not to mention, every single notice must be responded to, whereas
litigation does not result from every single infringing upload. As such, the
initial transaction cost savings afforded by the statutory safe harbor have
diminished, making the development of Content ID more attractive.
Second, the ability to takedown—but not to keep down—infringing
content represents a meaningful loss of perceived control for content
owners. For example, a recording artist cannot deny permission for their
song to serve as the background track for my home video of my dog
rubbing his bum on the carpet, nor—more consequentially—as the
background track for an anti-Semitic propaganda video. Under the statute,
the creator can only hope to remove it after the fact. Importantly, Content
ID restores to the creator the perceived ability to control their IP’s use.
In addition, Content ID is more effective than notice and takedown on
two principal measures. First, Content ID is extremely effective at
preventing the uploading of infringing content, since content owners get
first stab at stopping the upload before it goes up. Second, by introducing
a monetization option that most content owners opt for, Content ID is
better at keeping content up and available on the site, which benefits users
and society.
That said, Content ID also introduces a series of concerns. From a user
perspective, Content ID may block upload of non-infringing content (both
because the algorithms are far from perfect, and because participating
content owners tend to be overzealous in claiming).102 In addition, and
relatedly, fair use may not be given sufficient consideration.103 From a
small content owners’ perspective, Content ID is not useful because it is
not an option. Content ID was negotiated by and between YouTube and a

102. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 552 (2017) (describing “reckless and mistaken assertions of ownership”
as a potential false positive of systems like Content ID).
103. Id. at 531 (noting that “[i]dentifying fair use is a hard problem for any automated system”
(citing Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 56 (2001))).
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select group of major content owners who are the sole beneficiaries of the
program.104 From the perspective of YouTube’s prospective competitors,
the expectation set by Content ID—namely, that content owners should
have preemptive control—sets a high barrier to entry (given the cost of
setting up such a proprietary system). While some third-party rights
management services are slowly coming to market,105 their efficacy has
yet to be proven.
2.

Copyright Alert System

The recently terminated Copyright Alert System (CAS)—a voluntary
agreement between large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) like Comcast
and AT&T, and the two largest content industry organizations, the
Recording Industry Association of America (the RIAA) and the Motion
Picture Association of America (the MPAA)—functioned, arguably
successfully, for four years.106 The deal established terms in excess of the
obligations embodied in section 512(a) of the Copyright Act.107
Like section 512(c), section 512(a) aims to limit the liability of an
intermediary for the infringing actions of its users. Where section 512(c)
acts on OSPs, section 512(a) acts on ISPs, or companies that provide users
with internet access. In order to enjoy protection from liability,
section 512(i)(1)(A) requires ISPs to “adopt[] and reasonably
implement[] . . . a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s
system or network who are repeat infringers.”108 Although recent case law

104. YouTube defines this select group of content owners as those who “own exclusive rights to a
substantial body of original material that is frequently uploaded by the YouTube creator community.”
See Common Questions About Content ID: Who Can Use Content ID?, YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/698Q-LGR3].
105. See, e.g., HAAWK, https://www.haawk.com/ [https://perma.cc/AT7B-JJNH] (claiming to
specialize in “YouTube, Facebook, & Instagram rights management, UGC monetization, copyright
enforcement, . . . and micro sync licensing”).
106. CAS was terminated in 2017. See, e.g., Ted Johnson, Internet Service Providers, Studios and
Record Labels Call It Quits on Copyright Alert System, VARIETY (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/copyright-alerts-piracy-mpaa-comcast-att-1201971756/
[https://perma.cc/8588-2VBG] (quoting a joint statement from the Center for Copyright Information
noting that “[t]he program demonstrated that real progress is possible when content creators, Internet
innovators, and consumer advocates come together in a collaborative and consensus-driven
process . . . CAS succeeded in educating many people about the availability of legal content, as well
as about issues associated with online infringement”).
107. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512, with Chris Hoffman, What Is the New Copyright Alert System, and
How Does It Affect You?, HOW-TO GEEK (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:23 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/
140545/htg-explains-what-is-the-new-copyright-alert-system-and-how-does-it-affect-you/
[https://perma.cc/Q9NC-RYA5].
108. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
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has attempted to put some meat on the bones of this requirement,109 there
is no further guidance in the statute as to what is “reasonable”
or “appropriate.”
As with section 512(c), section 512(a) arguably allows ISPs to “use”
rights holders’ content to attract subscribers, so long as they “pay” by
adopting some kind of termination policy. CAS aimed to help ISPs meet
their section 512(i)(I)(A) requirements while reducing piracy. Under
CAS, users would receive a notice from participating ISPs whenever they
attempted to access web sites identified by content owners as containing
infringing content (e.g., a known torrent site). Users who received six or
more such notices were subject to penalties, such as a throttling of
their ispeed.
The private CAS agreement went beyond the statutory requirements of
section 512(a) in several important ways: First, it concretely defined
“repeat infringer;” the statute does not. Second, by soliciting a list of
infringing P2P sites, CAS effectively required “notice” from rights
holders where the statute does not. Once the threshold number of notices
have been exceeded, CAS extended something approaching a “right to
exclude” to rights holders, who could then ask to have a user’s access
throttled, for example. This represents a meaningful gain in perceived
control by the IP owner, who was previously powerless in the fight against
unlawful use of their property.
Finally, by defining “repeat infringer,” setting the number of offenses
until penalty at six, and specifying some acceptable forms of punishment,
CAS afforded ISPs a concrete means of demonstrating compliance with
their section 512(a) requirements. By alerting users when otherwise
ambiguous behavior violated copyright, CAS was broadly considered a
successful public-education platform.110
Despite these improvements over the statutory prescription, the CAS
system fell short in several areas. Notably, CAS’s prescribed penalties did
not include termination of service. For this reason, CAS was widely
believed to be effective for small-scale users (e.g., the teenaged boy
torrenting video games on the family account), but not for larger,
109. See, e.g., BMG Rights Mgmt. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 634, 654 (2015)
(holding Cox’s policy of defining “infringer” as someone adjudicated to be an infringer in court—
and thus suspending no one—to not meet the statute’s reasonable and appropriate standard).
110. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 106 (citing the statement issued by the Center for Copyright
Information (the entity responsible for administering the program) upon its demise: “‘The program
demonstrated that real progress is possible when content creators, Internet innovators, and consumer
advocates come together in a collaborative and consensus-driven process,’ the statement said. ‘CAS
succeeded in educating many people about the availability of legal content, as well as about issues
associated with online infringement . . . . While this particular program is ending, the parties remain
committed to voluntary and cooperative efforts to address these issues.’”).
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sophisticated pirates. In addition, the type of piracy that CAS worked
against was peer-to-peer file sharing, not online streaming-style piracy of
the sort that most often takes place on YouTube. The latter is much more
prevalent today than the former, and perhaps at least partially explains
CAS’s termination. One of the most frequent complaints about CAS
focused on the unilateral curation of a list of “infringing web sites” by
content owners (and without consultation with users or user
representatives).111 CAS’s demise is also illustrative of a limitation of
voluntary agreements of this sort: once they end, the onus falls once again
to Congress to decide whether or not to establish or continue a comparable
statutory arrangement. If nothing else, the existence and arguable success
of CAS tells lawmakers that ISPs are willing to take on additional
obligations (i.e., to move from a standard to a rule) in order to enjoy
greater immunity from copyright infringement liability.
3.

Terrestrial Performance Rights

Despite sweeping improvements to the bewildering world of music
licensing, one important right left untouched by the MMA is the terrestrial
performance right for sound recordings. Governed by section 114(d)(2) of
the Copyright Act, these rights are a frequent source of contention due to
the fact that internet radio stations, like Pandora, pay royalties to both the
owner(s) of the musical composition and the owner(s) of the sound
recording, while terrestrial radio stations, like Los Angeles’s KROQ, pay
royalties only to the owner(s) of the musical composition. This means, for
example, that a spin of Taylor Swift’s hit song Shake It Off on your local
FM radio station requires a performance royalty be paid to the owner(s)
of the musical composition only; Taylor Swift (in her capacity as owner
of the sound recording) is not paid. A spin of the same track on an internet
radio station like Pandora, however, would require royalties be paid to
both the owner(s) of the musical composition and the owner(s) of the

111. Corynne McSherry & Eric Goldman, The “Graduated Response” Deal: What if Users Had
Been at the Table?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 18, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/
07/graduated-response-deal-what-if-users-had-been [https://perma.cc/3L8L-MCZ3] (“The Internet
access providers will treat the content owners’ notices of infringement as presumptively
accurate, . . . [t]his burden-shift violates our traditional procedural due process norms and is based on
the presumed reliability of infringement-detection systems that subscribers haven’t vetted and to
which they cannot object.”). Similar concerns have been expressed, for example, with the MPAA’s
partnership with Donuts, a domain name registry, in which the MPAA may unilaterally report
copyright-infringing websites for suspension. See, e.g., Mitch Stoltz, MPAA May Like Donuts, but
They Shouldn’t Be the (Copyright) Police, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/mpaa-may-donuts-they-shouldnt-be-copyright-police
[https://perma.cc/8P66-67QP] (asserting that “domain registries and registrars shouldn’t take part in
policing the contents of websites and services”).
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sound recording.112
The disparity in royalties paid between digital and terrestrial
performance of sound recordings has long been a point of contention
between the sound recording and broadcast industries, and will continue
to be under the MMA. Broadcasters have traditionally resisted paying a
performance royalty for sound recordings on the basis that their
programming provides a valuable promotional service to recording
artists.113 In an effort to protect the terrestrial performance royalties to
which they are entitled, music publishers (the traditional owners of
musical compositions) have traditionally sided with broadcasters on
this,114 even justifying the disparity by pointing to the fact that sound
recordings are paid at a higher rate on the digital side.115
As a statutory license, section 114(d)(2) is a quintessential liability rule
that sets a statutory rate for digital public performance of sound
recordings. The rate is set by the CRB in five-year increments.116 Unlike
the mandatory statutory licenses governing many industries—such as
broadcast cable and satellite—section 114(e)(1) of the Copyright Act
specifically contemplates an opt-out for licensors and licensees by
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (granting an exclusive right, “in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission” (emphasis added)).
To further complicate matters, a spin of the same song on a so-called “preexisting satellite radio
station,” like Sirius XM, also requires royalties be paid to both the owner(s) of the musical
composition and the owner(s) of the sound recording, only here, the rate paid to the owner(s) of the
sound recording are significantly lower (while the composition rate remains the same).
113. The existence of payola—the controversial (and sometimes illegal) phenomenon of record
labels paying radio stations to play their music—arguably supports their claims, though there’s no
reason to understand digital radio as not providing this same (or perhaps even greater) promotional
value, particularly given digital radio’s ability to track listening habits. See, e.g., Payola Probe Settled
for $12 Million, CBS NEWS (May 11, 2006, 5:22 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/payolaprobe-settled-for-12-million/ [https://perma.cc/WJD8-HLNY] (quoting then-New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as finding that “UMG has illegally provided radio stations with
financial benefits to obtain airplay and boost the chart position of its songs”).
114. See John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global Harmonization
and the Need for Congress to Get in Step with a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings,
12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1053 (2000). Kettle discusses the National
Association of Broadcaster’s (the NAB’s) opposition to extending a terrestrial performance right for
sound recordings and notes that “[j]oining the NAB’s position against a full public performance right
for sound recordings are songwriters, music publishers, and performing rights societies. They claim
it is the songwriter and music publisher who will lose a substantial portion of income.” Id.
115. See, e.g., In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (testimony of
Martin Bandier) (declaring “[w]e were struck by the vast disparity between what the record companies
received from digital music services for the sound recording rights that they conveyed and what was
paid for the [musical composition] performance right”), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am.
Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 804(b)(1) (“Any change in royalty rates made under this chapter . . . may be
reconsidered in the year 2015, and each fifth calendar year thereafter.”). By default, section 114(d)(2)
also sets a statutory rate of zero for the terrestrial public performance of sound recordings.
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authorizing “copyright owners of sound recordings” and “any entities
performing sound recordings” to alternately “negotiate and agree upon the
royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the performance of such
sound recordings and the proportionate division of fees paid among
copyright owners, and may designate common agents on a nonexclusive
basis to negotiate, agree to, pay, or receive payments.”117
A private deal struck in June 2012 between recording artist Taylor
Swift’s former record label, Big Machine, and media conglomerate Clear
Channel Communications,118 circumvents the statutory section 114
license in favor of an agreement that effectively establishes a terrestrial
performance right for sound recordings—i.e., a liability right—where one
does not exist in the statute.119 In the deal, the parties agree to a lower
royalty rate for digital performance in exchange for, among other
things,120 the establishment of a new, terrestrial performance right for
Swift’s sound recordings. In other words, in exchange for a
lower-than-statutory royalty rate on the digital side, Clear Channel agreed
to recognize, and pay royalties on, a terrestrial performance right for
Swift’s recordings. On the digital side, the parties agreed to a performance
royalty to be calculated as a share of revenue, thereby circumventing
section 114—and with it, the collective rights organization Sound
Exchange—altogether.121
In so doing, the parties establish a new liability rule—a terrestrial
performance right—that sets, ex ante, a negotiated rate for use of Swift’s
recordings in Clear Channel’s programming. This sets Clear Channel up
to internalize what would otherwise be an externality resulting from its
gratis use of the recordings (and borne by the owner thereof). The deal
might also be characterized as a form of “self-help”—another remedy
traditionally associated with property rights—on the part of Swift: where
the Copyright Act failed to afford her a property entitlement in her sound
117. Id. § 114(e)(1).
118. Clear Channel Communications rebranded itself as iHeartMedia in late 2016. Clear Channel
Becomes iHeartMedia, IHEARTMEDIA (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.iheartmedia.com/press/clearchannel-becomes-iheartmedia [https://perma.cc/5J24-DH7K]. For simplicity and consistency, I
continue to use “Clear Channel” here.
119. To the extent that the non-existence of a terrestrial performance royalty in the statute can be
seen as a “zero-price” license, the deal between Clear Channel and Big Machine could be viewed as
contracting for a higher liability rule price.
120. One additional benefit for Clear Channel was the guarantee of exclusives from Swift, thereby
giving the media company an advantage over its competitors. Ed Christman, Exclusive: Clear
Channel, Big Machine Strike Deal to Pay Sound-Recording Performance Royalties to Label, Artists,
BILLBOARD (June 5, 2012), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/1094776/exclusive-clearchannel-big-machine-strike-deal-to-pay-sound-recording [https://perma.cc/359T-FX5D].
121. For a full discussion of the implications of this circumvention, see Kristelia A. García, Private
Copyright Reform, 20 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 31–38 (2013).
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recordings vis-à-vis broadcasters, she got it for herself. One framing might
even view the statute’s refusal to grant a terrestrial performance right as a
sort of regulatory taking from the owner of the sound recording.
Finally, and perhaps most interesting of all, the deal reached between
Big Machine and Clear Channel was not costless—lawyers were engaged,
and time and money were spent. This is in stark contrast to the near
costless use of the statutory license. In other words, the parties agreed to—
and did—incur significantly higher transaction costs in order to get this
deal done. As in the case of Content ID, this suggests that transaction costs
may no longer have the same prohibitive effect they once had.
The private deal brings several advantages over the statutory regime.
First, the shift from a per-play rate to a revenue share better aligns
incentives between broadcasters and record labels. Under the statutory
per-play regime, broadcasters are encouraged to minimize costs by
playing less music.122 In contrast, a revenue share may encourage the
playing of more music, since additional plays don’t cost more, and may
attract more listeners (and so more ad revenue), resulting in more money
for both parties. Relatedly, the deal encourages cooperation between
parties whose businesses are interdependent. A copacetic working
relationship can lead to content exclusives, more listeners, and more
revenue for both parties. The move to a revenue share model also
improves predictability. According to Clear Channel CEO, Bob Pittman,
I can’t build a business space based on paying money for every
time I play a song, but I can build a business by saying I will give
a percentage of revenue that I bring in. . . . What we are really
trying to do is come up with a predictable model.123
From Big Machine’s perspective, the recognition of a terrestrial
performance right marks a significant improvement in perceived control
over the performance of its intellectual property over terrestrial airwaves
(control that is perceived as nonexistent under the statute). In exchange
for this perceived control, the label is willing to accept less money than
the statute entitles it to on the digital side. This is particularly significant
given both parties’ recognition of the rise in digital revenues, and
concomitant fall in terrestrial revenues.
Despite these advantages, the deal between Big Machine and Clear
Channel introduces several concerns. Most directly, in its circumvention
of the statutory license, the deal also circumvents statutory payments to
third parties; namely, to session musicians and back-up singers as
122. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 120 (quoting Clear Channel CEO Bill Pittman as saying of
the status quo: “I don’t want to try and guess how much advertising I can sell It encourages us to try
and play as little music as possible”).
123. See id.
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provided for in section 114(g) of the Copyright Act.124 Congress explicitly
intended to protect these parties125—referred to collectively in the statute
as “performers”—but those protections are unilaterally removed as a
result of circumventing the statutory license. Performers aren’t the only
ones losing out in the deal; SoundExchange also loses its administrative
fee for royalties collected and distributed under the statute. As other
entities move to follow in Swift and Clear Channel’s footsteps,126 this
collective reduction in fees could negatively impact SoundExchange’s
ability to best serve its remaining members, while also setting a new
industry norm unattainable by smaller, less powerful entities.
4.

UppstArt

A new application called UppstArt uses blockchain technology to
enable visual artists to track art they sell so that if and when it is later
resold, they are able to enforce a so-called “resale royalty”127—i.e., a
mandatory payment at a predetermined price made by a subsequent
purchaser to the artist who created the work. This royalty is paid in
addition to whatever price the subsequent purchaser pays to the seller of
the work, thereby contracting around the first sale doctrine.128 Notably,
124. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) specifies the following distribution of royalties: 50% of receipts shall
be paid to the copyright owner; 2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an escrow account for
distribution to non-featured musicians; 2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an escrow account for
non-featured vocalists; and 45% of receipts shall be paid, on a per sound recording basis, to the
featured recording artist on the sound recording.
125. H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 23–24 (1995) (“Performers . . . receive their compensation for the
performance from the rightsholder on a contractual basis. The Committee intends the language of
section 114(g) to ensure that a fair share of the digital sound recording performance royalties goes to
the performers according to the terms of their contracts.”).
126. To date, parties have entered into a handful of similar agreements. See, e.g., Glenn Peoples,
Big Machine Label Group Signs Terrestrial Royalties Deal with Entercom, BILLBOARD BUS. (Sept.
20, 2012), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/record-labels/big-machine-label-group-signsterrestrial-1007954192.story#mjSF3atSRlbIYMil.99 [https://perma.cc/T5K6-VAGY] (describing
the Big Machine-Entercom deal and quoting Entercom President and CEO David Field as calling the
deal “a bold step forward to align our interests with those of Big Machine and their artists”); Dan Rys,
Clear Channel Inks Second Radio Royalties Label Deal, This Time with Glassnote, BILLBOARD BUS.
(Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/radio/clear-channel-inkssecond-radioroyalties-1007962302.story [https://perma.cc/AFG7-9HQQ] (describing the Clear ChannelGlassnote deal and quoting Glassnote Founder and CEO Daniel Glass, who described the deal as a
“partnership [that] aligns our business interests more closely with Clear Channel”); Ed Christman,
Big Machine Cuts Deal With Beasley Broadcasting to Share ‘Certain’ Revenue, BILLBOARD BUS.
(Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/1537936/big-machine-cuts-deal-withbeasley-broadcasting-to [https://perma.cc/359T-FX5D] (describing a deal “which will bring
terrestrial performance royalties to its artists in exchange for more predictable rates for its
digital broadcasting”).
127. UPPSTART, https://uppstart.io/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
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the first sale doctrine terminates an IP owner’s perceived control over
their work after the initial sales transaction. UppstArt takes that perception
of control back, and retains it with the artist.
UppstArt works by issuing a “digital certificate of authenticity” to
participating works of art. Upon initial sale, the digital certificate records
and preserves information about a work’s authorship and price history.
When a work is later resold, the digital certificate goes with it, and the
artist is automatically paid a resale royalty.129 In other words, a subsequent
purchaser agrees to terms of sale that include a resale royalty and the app
then automatically enforces this term.
To be clear, UppstArt aims to enforce a right to payment (for the resale
of a copyrighted work) that does not exist under the law. Indeed, the
notion of resale royalties has been repeatedly considered and explicitly
rejected by the legislature.130 This is so despite a report from the Copyright
Office urging their passage,131 and despite the existence of an equivalent
droit de suite in the European Union.132
Under current law, section 109 of the Copyright Act—commonly
referred to as the First Sale Doctrine—terminates a copyright holder’s
ownership rights at the point of first sale.133 This means that “the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord.”134 Thus, sellers and buyers who use the UppstArt
app to recognize and enforce a resale royalty are contracting into a liability
rule with a higher price.
The primary argument in favor of a resale royalty is that the right is

129. UppstArt Pays Resale Royalties to Emerging Artists with Blockchain Technology, PR
NEWSWIRE (July 24, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/uppstart-app-pays-resaleroyalties-to-emerging-artists-with-blockchain-technology-300685396.html [https://perma.cc/QR5H66MU].
130. American Royalties Too (ART) Act of 2015, H.R. 1881, 114th Cong.; Equity for Visual
Artists Act of 2011, H.R. 3688, 112th Cong.; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, H.R. 3221, 100th
Cong.; The Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong.; and The Visual Artists’
Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down California’s Resale Royalty Act—legislation that allowed artists to collect 5%
of all secondary market sales of their work conducted either in California or by a California-based
company—as an unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Close v. Sotheby’s,
894 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2018).
131. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS (2013),
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LR5LKLP].
132. Council Directive 2001/84, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 32 (EC).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
134. Id.
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generative of more artwork (a purported goal of copyright). There is some
evidence from the UK suggesting that this is true. In 2006, the UK passed
the Artist Resale Right (ARR) regime. The ARR implements resale
royalties on a sliding scale (based on the sale price of the work). In the
first twelve years following the ARR’s passage, DACS, a non-profit
visual artists’ rights management organization, distributed over £65
million to more than 5,000 artists, over half of which sold their works in
the lower end of the price range (suggesting these royalties don’t just
benefit wealthy artists).135 Some in favor of resale royalties view them as
necessary to right an imbalance of power (and with it, wealth) between
artists, and galleries and auctioneers: “Such measures protect artists
against speculators and dealers who can make millions as works
appreciate in value without giving a cent back to the artists who
made them.”136
The US reticence toward adoption of a resale royalty has been lauded
by commentators who see it as a coup for elite artists (and their estates) at
the cost of developing artists.137 Concern has also been expressed about
rights accretion, or the tendency for risk adverse licensees to “over
license” uses (like resale) for which no such permission or payment is
required.138 The introduction of a resale right might also be criticized as
potentially establishing an industry norm that exceeds the statute’s
protections. Indeed, many of the examples in this Part might be
characterized as private parties facing legal uncertainty who are “paying”
to avoid the risk of litigation.

135. Mark Waugh, We Owe Artists the Crucial Income Resale Royalties Provide, ARTSY (Aug. 8,
2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-owe-artists-crucial-income-resaleroyalties-provide [https://perma.cc/CL55-K5BW].
136. Nate Freeman, A U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Has Struck Down the Final Effort to Have
Artists Receive Royalties When Their Work Is Resold, ARTSY (July 10, 2018, 1:12 PM),
https://www.artsy.net/news/artsy-editorial-court-appeals-judge-struck-final-effort-artists-receiveroyalties-work-resold [https://perma.cc/73F5-MWKH].
137. Christopher Sprigman & Guy Rub, Resale Royalties Would Hurt Emerging Artists, ARTSY
(Aug. 8, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-resale-royalties-hurt-emergingartists [https://perma.cc/Z7SU-G2JB] (arguing that “[r]esale royalties take real money from the entire
art world, including young and struggling artists, and transfer most of it to a tiny group of famous and
rich super-artists”).
138. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 885 (2007) (noting that “the combination of ambiguous doctrine and risk-averse
licensing will, over time, cause entitlements to grow and public privilege to shrink”).
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B.

Voluntary Agreements that Explicitly Reject a Collective Rights
Organization

1.

Partial Withdrawal of Digital Public Performance Rights

Under the current copyright regime, there is no compulsory license for
the public performance of musical compositions. In the absence of an
intermediary, this would require a content owner and prospective licensee
to negotiate and agree to terms ex ante. In an analog world, individual
negotiations around the public performance of musical compositions have
been viewed as largely impractical. There is simply no reasonable means
for even the most sophisticated content owner to monitor every café, bar
and sports arena across the country for specific instances of its
copyrighted works being played. For this reason, public performance
rights for musical compositions have traditionally been handled by CROs.
ASCAP is one of the largest collectives for public performance
rights—commonly referred to as performance rights organizations (or
PROs). It is a non-profit organization that licenses, and collects royalties
for, the public performance of its members’ musical compositions. Like
other PROs, ASCAP offers prospective licensees various licensing
configurations, including the popular “blanket license,” which entitles a
licensee to use any and all works in ASCAP’s catalog. Without ASCAP
and its blanket license, the transaction costs for, say, a restaurant hoping
to play a mix of contemporary background music, might be
hopelessly prohibitive.
In many ways, collectives like ASCAP effectively function like
liability rules for their members, who—until recently—relinquished their
ability to exclude prospective licensees from using their content by opting
into the collective. This is precisely what Merges was referring to with the
phrase “contracting into liability rules”: “initially higher transaction costs
of property rule entitlements [such as those given to owners of musical
compositions] actually serve a benign purpose: they lead individual
[intellectual property rights] holders to form CROs [like ASCAP].”139
In other words, the CRO substitutes for a compulsory license, only
instead of the compulsory rate being set by the legislature, it is set by the
collective. In theory, this should result in better-tailored rate-setting since
the entity setting the rate—in this case, ASCAP—is ostensibly an
“expert.”140 In early 2014, something happened to suggest that this
hypothesis may no longer hold: two of the country’s three major music
139. Merges, supra note 1, at 1296.
140. See id. at 1295 (noting “two distinct advantages of CROs: expert tailoring and reduced
political economy problems”).
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publishers sought to withdraw their digital (but not analog) performance
rights from ASCAP in order to negotiate a higher rate directly with
prospective licensees.141
In doing so, these rights owners effectively rejected the CRO’s liability
regime, and instead “reclaimed” their property rights under section 106,
putting digital licensees on notice that ex ante negotiation is now required.
From the music publishers’ perspective, this partial withdrawal of rights
from ASCAP offered several efficiency advantages: In an analog world,
the transaction costs involved in monitoring many thousand physical
locations are prohibitive. In a digital world, where plays of a particular
track are easily and readily tracked, the transaction costs are significantly
diminished. There is even a cost savings—ASCAP’s administrative fee—
resulting from the publishers handling their own digital performance
licensing. Most importantly, the negotiated rate achieved by the
publishers was 25% higher than that dictated by ASCAP.142 And unlike
ASCAP, which operates under a consent decree requiring it to license its
catalog to all similarly-situated licensees at the same rate,143 individual
music publishers who have withdrawn now control their own catalogs,
and can collect any price the market will bear.
The major music publishers’ rejection of ASCAP introduces some
concerns. Because only large, powerful publishers had the bargaining
power to demand direct negotiation, their withdrawal from ASCAP left
smaller, less powerful rights owners holding the bag: with reduced
administrative fees coming in, but steady overhead costs (as most of those
costs come from analog enforcement), fewer members must now pay
more for less. Indeed, without the major publishers’ content, ASCAPs
bargaining power vis-à-vis prospective licensees—i.e., the appeal of its
“blanket license”—is greatly diminished. In this way, adverse selection
decreases the efficiency and efficacy of the abandoned collective.
Another concern is the potential for the privately negotiated rate to be
misrepresented as a “market rate.” This is particularly concerning in an
industry like music publishing where collectives have always dominated
and so no true “market” exists. Finally, collectives like ASCAP ensure
access to content for all prospective licensees willing to pay the stated rate

141. For a full history of this move, including the controversy surrounding it and eventual outcome,
see Kristelia A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
183 (2016).
142. See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Pandora
Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015). Due to various findings amounting, effectively,
to tacit collusion and parallel pricing, the rate ultimately allowed by the rate court was lower than
initially negotiated, but still higher than the ASCAP rate. García, supra note 141, at 203–06.
143. See Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d at 339.
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and to comply with the stated licensing terms. In ASCAP’s case, this is
enforced by consent decree.144 The consent decree under which ASCAP
operates does not permit it to extend a license to one internet radio service
but not another. Private licensing, of course, makes no such guarantees.
In a highly-consolidated market like music publishing, this opens the door
for anticompetitive behavior.145
2.

Pandora and SoundExchange

Section 114(d)(2) of the Copyright Act establishes a compulsory
license for the digital public performance of sound recordings.146 That
compulsory license is administered by a collective known as
SoundExchange. Like other CROs, SoundExchange works by
encouraging owners of sound recordings to claim/register their works
with the collective, which then begins collecting and administering
royalties in exchange for an administrative fee.147 Like many compulsory
licenses in copyright, the section 114(d)(2) license is circumventable,
meaning that prospective licensors and licensees reserve the right to
bypass the statutory option and instead to negotiate a private
licensing deal.
In early 2018, with the backdrop of a poorly-tailored liability rule in
section 114(d)(2), Pandora opted for circumvention and negotiation with
fifty different major and independent record labels.148 Specifically, they
opted out of the section 114(d)(2) license with respect to two out of three
tiers on which the service operates. Tier 1 is Pandora’s ad-supported (i.e.,
free) radio service; Tier 2 is its subscription radio service (called Pandora
Plus); and Tier 3 is its new, fully-interactive subscription streaming
service (called Pandora Premium). Pandora currently uses the statutory
license only for Tier 1 (the service’s lowest-grossing platform).149
As with the Big Machine-Clear Channel deal, here we see Pandora
forego the cost-saving compulsory license to instead explicitly recognize
the labels’ property rule protections in their content. While the agreement
is not publicly available, we can assume that it offers a predictable set of
144. United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
145. See García, supra note 141, at 218.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).
147. See About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE, https://www.soundexchange.com/artistcopyright-owner/digital-royalties/ [https://perma.cc/R5HM-EYXR].
148. See Lennon Cihak, Pandora Moves to Direct Deal with Labels, SoundExchange’s Payouts
Plunge 26.2%, DIGIT. MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/03/
18/pandora-moves-direct-deal-labels-soundexchanges-payouts-plunge-26-2/ [https://perma.cc/
Q6XQ-XWC9].
149. Id.
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advantages: a known rate not subject to periodic adjustment; an
administrative fee savings; and the opportunity for a better-aligned
relationship between content owners and platform. For the content
owners, we see the same reclaiming of perceived control over their
property and its licensure.
The deals also present a now predictable set of concerns often seen
upon withdrawal from a CRO, including the possibility of adverse
selection (as smaller competitors are unlikely to strike similar deals), and
the eventual setting of an industry norm based on a rate that might be
misrepresentative of the market. Perhaps most concerning is the fact
that—as with the circumvention seen in the case of terrestrial performance
rights—third parties’ rights may be negatively affected. Specifically,
artists themselves are only paid directly when paid through
SoundExchange (which now handles only Pandora’s Tier 1 pay-outs).
Whether, and what, they might be paid under the privately-negotiated
deals for Tier 2 and Tier 3 plays is entirely dependent upon the terms of
those deals (negotiations in which they took no part) and/or the terms of
the individual artists’ deals with their respective labels, which may not
account for such payments at all.
3.

Spotify’s “Fake Artists”

Music streaming services like Spotify use both (i) the section 114
compulsory license for their use of sound recordings streamed by their
users,150 and (ii) the section 115 compulsory license for use of the musical
compositions underlying the sound recordings streamed by their users.151
The section 114 license is administered by SoundExchange, while the
section 115 license is administered by several collectives, including
ASCAP, BMI and SESAC.152
As discussed at section III.A.3 above, the initial property right
entitlements afforded creators under the copyright laws can result in an
untenable transaction cost problem. To overcome this, the holders of these
property rights typically relinquish them to a collective—such as
SoundExchange or ASCAP—that in turn effectively sets up a liability
regime (in which the collective rate functions like a compulsory rate).
Membership in a collective additionally offers consolidated bargaining
150. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).
151. Id. § 115(d). The MMA replaced former section 115(c)(3) with section 115(d), a blanket
license for digital uses to be administered by a newly-formed Mechanical Licensing Collective
(MLC).
152. The smallest of the “big three” collectives, SESAC originally stood for Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers, but the organization now simply goes by SESAC. SOC’Y EUR. STAGE
AUTHORS & COMPOSERS, https://www.sesac.com/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
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power, and administrative and enforcement capabilities.
Recently, news stories surfaced accusing music streaming service
Spotify of “padding” its platform-curated playlists with so-called “fake
artists.”153 Complainants alleged that Spotify “pays producers upfront to
create fake artists.” 154 “These fake artists then rack up plays without the
streamer [here, Spotify] having to worry about handing over further
royalty payments.”155 Simply put, Spotify and its “fake artists” were
circumventing both the section 114 and section 115 licenses (and, by
extension, the relevant collectives), and instead striking private, flat-rate
deals on a track-by-track basis.
What these reports called “fake artists” turned out to be real-life music
producers most likely commissioned by Spotify to create tracks for which
they pay a lump-sum upfront (in lieu of statutory royalties).156 In other
words, “[d]escribing these [acts] as ‘fake artists’ is like calling J.K.
Rowling a fake author when she published novels in a different genre
under the name Robert Galbraith.”157 Participating producers have opted
out of the respective collectives for both sound recordings (i.e.,
SoundExchange), and musical compositions (i.e., ASCAP/BMI/SESAC)
in favor of a private deal in which they sell Spotify a song the way a bike
shop might sell a bike to a customer—straight out, for cash or its
equivalent, without further obligation nor involvement.
Because they pay the private producers a negotiated rate upfront with
no uncertainty as to what future royalties might look like, and no pesky
per-stream calculations, the most obvious advantage to this deal for
Spotify is a flat and predictable cost for their most expensive input. As
with the introduction of a revenue share in the creation of a terrestrial
performance right, the flat-fee agreement between Spotify and the private
producers also better aligns the incentives: because its costs won’t
increase with plays, Spotify is encouraged to place the tracks prominently
in popular playlists. Indeed, it is precisely the prominent and frequent

153. See Daniel Sanchez, Spotify Allegedly Creates Fake Artists to Avoid Paying Real Ones
(Updated), DIGIT. MUSIC NEWS (July 7, 2017), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/07/07/
spotify-fake-artists-payment/ [https://perma.cc/B7CZ-CSMA].
154. See Tim Ingham, Spotify Denies It’s Playlisting Fake Artists. So Why Are All These Fake
Artists on Its Playlists?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (July 9, 2017), https://www.musicbusiness
worldwide.com/spotify-denies-its-playlisting-fake-artists-so-why-are-all-these-fake-artists-on-itsplaylists/ [https://perma.cc/R45S-5W8F].
155. Id.
156. Id. (describing “a producer in Europe who claimed that he’d done a deal with Spotify to create
songs under ‘fake’ artist names”).
157. Tim Ingham, So . . . Who’s Actually Behind Spotify’s Fake Artists?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE
(July 10, 2017), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/so-whos-actually-behind-spotifys-fakeartists/ [https://perma.cc/S26N-NHV5].
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placement of such tracks that brought this arrangement to light in the
first place.
From the producers’ perspective, more plays are also better, not so
much for the exposure—they are producing the tracks under pseudonyms,
after all—but because a successful track is more likely to lead Spotify to
commission additional tracks in the future. Moreover, Spotify doesn’t
have to worry about competing with other streaming services for
exclusives around its commissioned tracks, since the flat-fee buys the
track outright, copyright and all. In other words, the agreement functions
like a work-made-for-hire, in which Spotify commissions and buys a song
like a consumer might design and buy a bicycle. The tracks are all
“exclusive” to Spotify.
The deals between Spotify and the commissioned producers have the
potential to suffer some of the same downsides as the establishment of
terrestrial performance rights; specifically, they introduce concerns about
adverse selection and distributive justice. In this context, however, these
concerns—namely, that only powerful parties can participate, and that
their doing so can set unattainable industry expectations—arguably carry
less weight. First of all, the primary complainants in this case are large
music labels (not smaller, weaker entities). Given that the deals are not
public, we don’t know what the flat fees are, but there is no shortage of
music producers looking for work, and we’ve no information to suggest
that an acceptable rate couldn’t be reached between one of them and a
streaming service of any size and bargaining position.
C.

Bribing v. Buying

Each of these examples starts with a (poorly tailored) liability rule or
its functional equivalent. This effectively grants a prospective licensee a
“call option” under which they can “take” a licensor’s work in exchange
for some predetermined damage/royalty rate. The licensor, in turn, has an
entitlement subject to the licensee’s exercise of the call option. In other
words, the licensee holds the “short” position while the licensor holds the
“long” position.158 When an entitlement is protected by such a liability
rule, Ayres and Talley suggest that there are two categories of Coasean
bargains that parties—they refer to a “plaintiff” and a “defendant”—can
enter into: First, the plaintiff can “bribe” the defendant not to exercise the
option. Alternately, the defendant can “buy” the plaintiff’s entitlement.159
158. The “bribe” and “buy” language is Ayres’s and Talley’s. I borrow the option language from
the financial literature. For the classic statement on call options in finance, see Fischer Black & Myron
Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637–39 (1973).
159. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 19, at 1041–42.
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For our purposes, these two categories can be framed as: (1) the
licensor can “bribe” the licensee not to utilize the statutory license (or its
equivalent); or, (2) the licensee can “buy” the licensor’s entitlement. In
the first category, the statutory rate is set below either or both of the
licensor’s and/or the licensee’s valuation. In the second category, the
statutory rate is set above either or both of the licensee’s and/or the
licensor’s valuations, like so:
Table 1:
Two Coasean Bargains in the Shadow of a
Poorly-Tailored Liability Rule
Statutory rate
too low
Licensor can “bribe”
the licensee not to
utilize the statutory
license

Entitlement
protected by a
liability rule (or
its equivalent)

Statutory rate
too high
Licensee can “buy”
the licensor’s
entitlement

Breaking down the examples into these two categories, we see that all
but one fall into the “statutory rate is too low” category, and only two fall
into the “statutory rate too high” category. One of the examples—
terrestrial performance rights—falls into both categories by virtue of the
fact that the relevant deal both lowers the digital performance royalty rate,
and raises (above zero) the terrestrial performance rate. Importantly, and
predictably, all of the examples demonstrate a mismatch between the
statutory rate and the actual valuation.
Table 2:
Category Breakdown by Example

Content ID
Copyright Alert
System
Terrestrial
Performance Rights
UppsArt
Partial Withdrawals
of Digital
Performance Rights
Pandora &
SoundExchange

Rate too low = Bribe
X
X

Rate too high = Buy

X
X

X

X
X
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In the case of Content ID, for example, the licensee is YouTube, the
licensors are the participating content owners, and the statutory default is
Notice-and-Takedown. The agreement reached via Content ID sees major
content owners “bribe” YouTube (via threat of litigation) into foregoing
its safe harbor rights under section 512(c), and instead to extend to them
(i) a right to exclude (on the upload) allegedly infringing copies of their
work; and/or (ii) payment of advertising revenues for works that they
decide to allow and claim. Per the framework illustrated in Table 2, this
“bribe/agreement” is the result of a statute (in this instance,
Notice-and-Takedown) that sets the rate for use too low (relative to the
parties’ respective valuations). This leaves room for both parties to
improve their positions: On the one hand, the content owners value their
content more highly than a useless and ineffective takedown. On the other
hand, YouTube is willing to pay more in order to forego responding to a
never-ending and costly barrage of notices while also avoiding
unpredictable litigation (and potentially astronomical statutory damages)
in the event of untimely or inadequate takedowns. In this case, YouTube
paid something in the neighborhood of $100 million for the development
of Content ID, plus an ongoing share of ad revenues. The CAS
bribe/agreement followed a similar track.
Terrestrial performance rights present a unique context in which we see
both a bribing and a buying in the same agreement. In that deal, the
licensee is Clear Channel and the licensor is Big Machine. There are
effectively two poorly-tailored default liability rules (hence the dual
bribing-and-buying nature of the deal): a too-high digital performance
royalty rate, and a too-low (i.e., zero) analog performance royalty rate. As
such, we see Big Machine “bribing” Clear Channel to pay something
greater than zero on the analog side, while Clear Channel simultaneously
“buys” Big Machine’s right to a higher statutory digital royalty in
exchange for a lower one. The “bribe” is accomplished via acceptance of
a lower digital rate and the offer of exclusive content. The cost of the
“buy” is a terrestrial performance right.
The partial withdrawal of digital public performance rights shows that
a “bribe” can be effected even in the absence of a willing licensee. In that
example, Pandora is the licensee and the major publishers are the
licensors. The default liability rule is ASCAP’s statutory rate, which the
licensors (but not the licensees) have deemed too low. As such, the
publishers unilaterally withdraw their digital content from ASCAP in
order to “bribe” Pandora into paying a higher rate, as it no longer has any
other way to access the content.
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All of this demonstrates that where the statutory rate (or its equivalent)
is lower than the valuation of the licensor, it makes sense for the licensor
to try to get the licensee to pay more. It is helpful (but not necessary) if
the statutory rate is also less than the licensee’s valuation. We also see that
in order for the licensee to agree to pay more than it has to, the licensor
must offer something more (i.e., something not required, or contemplated,
by the statute), or eliminate other options (i.e., face a circumventable
statutory default) in order to force a deal. These conditions, it appears, can
overcome previously prohibitive transaction costs.
D.

Predictive Factors

From the preceding examples emerge several shared characteristics
that may lend some predictability as to when parties subject to a default
liability regime are likely to contract into super-statutory terms. First, we
see that in each case, the underlying statute serves as a penalty default,
which is to say, as an undesirable backstop to be avoided by parties with
the means to do so.160 This undesirability stems from several sources, the
most significant and consistent being the uncertainty associated with
them. Not only are the statutory rates established in the Copyright Act
subject to adjustment every five years, but legislation, such as the MMA,
can—and sometimes does—alter, and even eliminate, these licenses at
any time.
In addition, the statutory rates are set by a process that is subject to
manipulation. The CRB rate-setting procedure involves soliciting
feedback from interested parties, the most vocal and frequent of which
tend to be those with the deepest pockets and with the largest share of
content subject to license. These licensors do not always represent the
interests and preferences of smaller, more diverse rights holders.
The existence of differential regulatory treatment is another factor that
may lead to a private preference for either stronger liability rules or for
property rules over liability rules. As in the case of terrestrial performance
rights, for example, where digital radio stations pay the owners of sound
recordings for spins but terrestrial radio stations don’t, unequal treatment
of similarly-situated entities can serve as an impetus for agreements that
opt out of a liability regime.
Of course, inefficiency can also serve as an impetus for private
ordering. Individual negotiation allows for a rate tailored to a specific use
and for specific content, thereby better aligning incentives between the
160. For more on penalty default licenses and their impact on private ordering decisions, see
Kristelia A. García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1182–
83 (2014).
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parties. A private deal can also be readily amended in response to changes
in business model, consumer preferences, or technology. Private ordering
may also do a better job of taking market valuations into account, resulting
in more accurate pricing for the ultimate consumer, while simultaneously
encouraging licensors to create, and licensees to invest.161
Notably, each of the examples cited involves a situation in which
previously prohibitive transaction costs have been mitigated, thereby
reducing or removing a traditional hurdle to private ordering. This may
also explain the waning interest in CROs, whose traditional strength—
consolidation (both of content and of bargaining power)—has also
been diminished.
Finally, a consistent predictive factor demonstrated by the examples is
perceived control on the part of the rights holder. The examples
unanimously demonstrate that a perceived diminution in control over the
licensor’s copyrighted work (via the statutory license or its equivalent) is
highly likely to trigger private ordering. On the part of the licensor anxious
to regain a sense of control over their work, we see unusual concessions;
on the part of the licensee holding the perception of control as an asset
granted under the compulsory license, we see it used as a valuable
bargaining chip.
IV. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERFACE: IMPLICATIONS
Parts II and III portray a legal regime—copyright—taking an
increasingly regulatory turn at the same time as private ordering in the
space has plotted an undeniable turn to super-statutory contracting. This
observation turns on its head the conventional wisdom in law and
economics that says that property rules induce contracting, while liability
rules induce litigation.162 On one hand, it might also be viewed as
challenging the accepted notion that intellectual property is best protected
by liability rules, both because of the unique character of IP as asset,163
and because of the prohibitively high transaction costs traditionally

161. Id. at 1133.
162. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 104 (5th ed. 2012)
(stating that “[i]f transaction costs are so high as to preclude bargaining, then the more efficient
remedy is damages, not injunctions”); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1993) (calling property rules
more efficient where the goal is to “induce the parties to negotiate”); David D. Haddock, Fred S.
McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal
Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990) (suggesting that liability rules allow defendants to take
plaintiffs and pay liability damages rather than negotiate as they would under property rules).
163. See Merges, supra note 54, at 2656 (noting that strong property rules are particularly
well-suited “where unique assets [i.e., IP] are exchanged”).

Garcia (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/14/2020 9:55 PM

SUPER-STATUTORY CONTRACTING

1823

associated with IP.164 On the other hand, it might suggest that we don’t
need to be overly concerned about whether the government gets statutory
rates right, since the parties can bargain around them.
Importantly, the private copyright deals described herein reveal
information about private market valuations that might otherwise not be
disclosed. This contribution is particularly valuable in copyright, where
many uses of copyrighted works—e.g., streaming—developed
simultaneously alongside (or after) the applicable statutory license(s). The
phenomenon also comports with Ayres and Talley’s theory of liability
rules as information-forcing.165 In some instances, the revealed
information might be public-facing. For example, in both the case of
terrestrial performance rights and the case of resale royalties, the existence
of private deals recognizing newly established “rights” and their
concomitant pricing might signal to the legislature that such a right can
be sustained by the market, and may even suggest what the “market price”
might look like. In other cases, the information revealed might be
private-facing; for example, Spotify’s flat-rate deals with music producers
put prospective producer-partners on notice that an alternative to the
traditional “record label-and-statutory royalty” exists.
Contrary to Ayres and Talley’s prediction that the statutory rate
necessarily sets a ceiling on the negotiated rate,166 our examples show that
a licensor may be willing to accept less—and/or a licensee may be willing
to pay more—than the statutory rate in certain circumstances. In the
example of Clear Channel and Big Machine, for instance, both parties
agree to pay (or accept) more (or less) than they have to: Clear Channel
agrees to pay more than zero for analog plays, and Big Machine agrees to
accept less than the statutory rate for digital plays. This is due, in large
part, to other considerations separate and apart from price.167 Indeed, the
shift away from a liability regime and toward a property one has several
implications, as discussed in turn below.

164. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 213 (2003) (stating that “transaction costs may be prohibitive if
creators of new intellectual property must obtain licenses to use all the previous intellectual property
they seek to incorporate”).
165. Ayres & Talley, supra note 19, at 1032 (“We show that liability rules possess an
‘information-forcing’ quality that property rules do not.”).
166. See id. at 1046 (discussing the damage amount under a liability rule as a ceiling).
167. These considerations might include such things as exclusive content, early content, bundled
content, etc. In some cases, it is possible that these separate considerations might constitute an illegal
tying arrangement, but as such analysis exceeds the scope of this paper, it is reserved for future
research.
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Transaction Costs and Collective Advantage

One of the primary implications of a private move away from statutory
protections is that transaction costs, in many cases, turn out to be lower
than previously understood. These lower transaction costs reduce the
utility of statutory licenses because it now costs less for parties to locate,
and bargain with, their respective counterparts. Several factors have
contributed to this shift: For one thing, consolidation in the copyright
industries—film studios, record labels, publishing companies—has
resulted in fewer parties to reach out to in order to secure the content
necessary to launch a content-related business venture. A fledgling
streaming music service, for example, ostensibly need engage in only four
negotiations around sound recordings (one with each of the major record
labels, and one with an organization representing a group of prominent
independent labels). The digitization of content has also reduced the cost
associated with delivering, sharing, using, and reworking content. As
demonstrated in the case of music publishers seeking to withdraw their
digital rights from ASCAP, the ability to handle digital rights licensing,
collection, and administration in-house reduces both the cost of doing
business, and the value of engaging in collective behavior.
Relatedly, the rejection of CROs—as seen in the examples at
section III.B above—reflects not only a lower threshold of transaction
costs to be overcome, but also a decreased need for consolidated
bargaining power. Many of the other advantages traditionally attributed
to CROs have similarly diminished over time. For example, compulsory
licenses have been criticized for their susceptibility to lobbying and
special interests.168 The same concern can be seen, however, in the case
of a CRO like ASCAP, where a very few members of the collective
comprise the majority of revenues. When the major music publishers first
sought to withdraw their digital rights from ASCAP, they hit a roadblock:
ASCAP’s governing documents didn’t allow partial withdrawals—it was
all or nothing. Faced with the looming threat of full withdrawal (and the
concomitant decimation of administrative fees), ASCAP took the unusual
step of actually amending its articles to allow for partial withdrawal, a
move arguably against the interest of its smaller members.169
CROs have also been lauded for their flexibility, and for their ability to

168. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 1, at 1308 (noting that “the fact that liability rules are established
by the legislature and applied mechanically makes them susceptible to lobbying”).
169. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Pandora
Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015). For a detailed discussion of this conundrum, see
also García, supra note 141, at 200–03.
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expertly tailor rates in a way that legislators cannot hope to do.170
Unfortunately, the consent decrees under which large CROs like ASCAP
and BMI operate under work to limit this ability. The consent decrees—
widely accepted as necessary to prevent exertion of monopoly power—
mandate that the same terms be extended to all similarly-situated entities,
thereby curbing the collectives’ ability to act like true market players. As
Peter DiCola and Matthew Sag have observed: “Contrary to the customary
modern portrayal of ASCAP and BMI as private solutions to a
transaction-cost or negotiating problem, the historical record clearly
reveals that ASCAP and BMI have always been the hybrid products of
both public and private ordering.”171
Finally, some commentators prefer a CRO-mandated rate to a
legislatively-mandated rate because the former are believed to be “the
product of internal negotiations by knowledgeable people in the industry;”
as such, “the rules they devise are more likely than the compulsory license
to approximate market bargains.”172 While it’s true that the members of a
CRO like ASCAP are “people in the industry,” it is, unfortunately, not the
case that the rules and rates ultimately devised represent the preferences
of all members, but rather only those of a few large and powerful
members. In this way too, the advantages of CROs over compulsory
licensing are diminished.
The recent and highly-contentious contest for control of the
newly-formed Music Licensing Collective, a non-profit organization
charged with the collection and distribution of mechanical royalties under
the MMA,173 is a good exemplar of this tension. Per the MMA, the
Register of Copyrights was given 270 days from the date of enactment to
designate the members of a newly-formed collective.174 Two groups
applied for the role: one—composed of major music publishers—called
itself (one might say, aspirationally) the Music Licensing Collective (the
MLC). The other, composed of songwriters, musicians, tech developers,
and executives from smaller rights organizations, called itself the
American Music Licensing Collective (the AMLC). As the Register
reviewed the applications, both groups took to both traditional and social
media to badmouth the opposition. The AMLC called the MLC conflicted,
170. See Merges, supra note 1, at 1299 (“Industry participants faced with the need to transact over
and over again could probably work out something much more in tune with their needs than a
congressional scheme of one-size-fits-all transactions.”).
171. Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 208 (2012).
172. Merges, supra note 1, at 1300.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)(A)–(C).
174. Id. at § 115(d)(3)(B).
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while the MLC called the AMLC unqualified.175 At its core, this was a
battle was over whether larger and more powerful, or smaller and less
powerful, members of the interested group would control the purse, with
each side convinced that the other would not have their respective best
interests at heart. On July 5, 2019, the Copyright Office appointed the
MLC to run the collective.176 It is too soon to determine whether the
AMLC’s fears will be realized.
From a competition perspective, perhaps the greatest drawback to
CROs in today’s highly concentrated content markets is the propensity for
collective action to discourage (or eliminate) any attempt at price
competition, particularly from the members with the largest market
shares. In his testimony before the CRB with regard to Pandora in In re
Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and
Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV),177 Carl Shapiro
observed that:
[T]he three largest record companies, Universal Music Group,
Sony Music, and Warner Music Group, only rarely offer
discounted royalty rates to statutory webcasters to gain more
plays from those webcasters . . . . One reason for this dearth of
competition is that SoundExchange is able to negotiate on behalf
of the record labels as a group. When SoundExchange is
negotiating with a music user on behalf of a group of record
companies, those negotiations by definition do not include any
element of price competition among those record companies. In
the language of oligopoly theory, if SoundExchange can achieve
collusive rates, those rates can provide a convenient and attractive
focal point for the record companies, which discourages
individual record companies from breaking ranks by initiating
price competition. In the language of antitrust economists,
SoundExchange can facilitate coordinated interaction among the
record companies. . . . [S]uppliers with the largest market shares
175. See generally Steve Brachmann, Music Industry Groups Square Off Against Songwriters,
Small Publishers in Mechanical Licensing Collective Battle, IP WATCHDOG (May 6, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/06/music-industry-groups-square-off-songwriters-smallpublishers-mechanical-licensing-collective-battle/id=108982/ [https://perma.cc/P6KG-B4U7]; Kyle
Jahner, Big Music Publishers, Songwriters Win Digital Collective Bid, BLOOMBERG L. (July 5, 2019,
12:40 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/bigmusic-publishers-songwriters-win-digitalcollective-bid [https://perma.cc/2LGG-T6GL] (noting that AMLC criticized MLCI for being
“beholden to large music publishers” and “conflicted because its members would benefit the most
whenever the Mechanical Licensing Collective can’t determine where royalties should go”).
176. Copyright Office Confirms NMPA-Endorsed Mechanical Licensing Collective, VARIETY (July
5, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/music/news/copyright-office-confirms-nmpa-endorsedmechanical-licensing-collective-1203260173/ [https://perma.cc/A758-5T9G].
177. No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (Copyright Royalty Bd. May 30, 2014).
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are the least likely to “defect” from a coordinated outcome by
offering discounts to gain market share. The larger a firm’s
market share, the more that firm has to lose from disrupting the
status quo. Plus, when a firm with a larger market share engages
in discounting to win more business, it is more likely that its rivals
will detect that discounting and respond in kind. Anticipating
these responses, the firm with the large market share will be less
inclined to initiate discounting in the first place. For all of these
reasons, coordinated interaction is a greater risk to competition in
more concentrated markets, as emphasized by the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.
The presence of the statutory license also can create an
impediment to competition. In general, when one supplier is
considering initiating a price discount to gain market share, it
must consider how those discounts will affect the overall level of
prices in the market. A supplier will be discouraged from offering
a discount if it expects that discount to be widely matched,
because this would lead to little or no change in market shares but
a lower price level in the market overall. This tendency can create
an anticompetitive dynamic when prices are negotiated in the
shadow of a statutory license: record companies, especially the
larger ones, will be discouraged from offering discounts if they
expect that those discounted royalty rates will pull down the
statutory rate in the future. Unfortunately, this dynamic can be
especially powerful if the statutory rate is set well above the rate
that would result from effective competition. In that case, the
statutory rate serves as an anchor, keeping negotiated rates above
the level that would result from effective competition.
Putting the pieces together, it appears that several features of the
market for recorded music used by webcasters have combined to
discourage record companies from competing royalty rates down
to competitive levels: the presence of SoundExchange with its
antitrust immunity to negotiate on behalf of the record companies
collectively; the significant share of the market accounted for by
the three major record companies; and the shadow of the statutory
licensing regime.178
It is possible that over time, and in sufficient number, private
agreements that circumvent the statutory license—to the extent they begin
to set an industry expectation—may actually work to overcome the
178. See Written Direct Testimony of Carl Shapiro at 14–15, Web IV, No. 14-CRB-0001WR (citations omitted), https://www.crb.gov/rate/14-CRB-0001-WR/statements/
Pandora/14_Written_Direct_Testimony_of_Carl_Shapiro_with_Appendices_PUBLIC_pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E54E-946L].
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anticompetitive effects of collective action and compulsory licensing.
B.

The Role of Law in Super-Statutory Contracting: Penalty Default
vs. Backstop

There are a couple of different ways to view the role of the relevant law
where private ordering amounts to super-statutory contracting: We can
think of the law as prompting the behavior—a penalty default scenario—
or we can think of it as a backstop—largely inconsequential, but available
if needed. This section will consider these possibilities in turn.
Where a compulsory license (or its statutory equivalent) is
circumventable, it may serve as a default license. In such a case, the
statutory license kicks in only if parties don’t make other arrangements.
Compulsory licenses (or their statutory equivalents) that are
poorly-tailored and subject to high levels of unpredictability, like those in
copyright, may moreover be classified as “penalty default licenses,” or
licenses that use “bounded uncertainty to induce private ordering.”179 In
other words, an inefficient statutory license can push parties out of the
statute and into private negotiation. A predictable, well-tailored license
perceived as accurately reflecting market valuations would be unlikely to
lead to the levels of opt-out and private ordering seen in copyright today.
Instead, we see parties opting for private deals where the default is
perceived as untrustworthy and uncertain—private ordering as correction,
if you will, to a statutory misvaluation. It is tempting to conclude, then,
that so long as the statutory license is circumventable, we needn’t worry
much about tailoring or accuracy, since parties can always opt for a private
agreement. This assumes, however, a level of bargaining power and
access to resources that is rarely uniform across constituencies.
Another characterization of the phenomenon observed herein is that the
statute is merely a backdrop, largely ignored, with the real action taking
place in private deals. In his seminal work on community norms in
property involving ranchers in Shasta County, Bob Ellickson identified
five “controllers,” or entities that govern societal interaction: the self,
express contracts, informal social norms, hierarchical private
organizations, and the state.180 Of these, he found social norms highly
influential, while recognizing private contracting’s relative advantage
when it comes to recognizing subjective valuations and reducing
deadweight loss.181 These benefits are amplified when parties are able to
179. García, supra 160, at 1122 (citations omitted).
180. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 124–
36 (1991).
181. Id. at 246–48.
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lower transaction costs through repeat interaction, as is often the case in
private copyright deals.
Unlike Ellickson’s ranchers in Shasta County, however, private
ordering that circumvents extant law is not (yet) the norm in copyright.
Instead, the examples described in Part III involve superstars and industry
players with large market shares and lots of bargaining power. For now,
private ordering is for the haves; the (inferior) compulsory license is for
the have-nots. This supports the view of the role of law here as that of
penalty default, encouraging those who can to negotiate a better deal
extralegally, while leaving those who can’t to the less desirable
compulsory license (or its equivalent).
To this point, context is extremely important for the observations made
herein. The described dynamic of privately negotiating a super-statutory
contract will be observed only where both parties (a) have the means and
bargaining power to successfully navigate such a negotiation, and (b) will
be better off under the private arrangement. Where these conditions are
not met, we should instead find ourselves in Merges’s world, where less
powerful parties consolidate their respective positions in hopes of
incremental improvement.
C.

Damages

Breach of a liability rule generally leads to monetary damages, while
breach of a property rule generally leads to an equitable remedy, like an
injunction. In copyright, the owner of an infringed work can elect either
actual or statutory damages.182 Statutory damages for copyright
infringement range from $750 to $30,000 per infringed work,183 jumping
to $150,000 in the case of willful infringement.184
The shift toward super-statutory contracting in the shadow of a liability
regime suggests that the practical distinction between equitable and
monetary relief in copyright may be fading. In many instances, the threat
182. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)–(c).
183. Id. § 504(c)(1).
184. Id. § 504(c)(2). Recent empirical work suggests that these numbers have little to do with actual
harm, and everything to do with deterrence. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the
Digital Age: When the Remedy Is the Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV. 400, 407 (2019) (“Plaintiffs sought
enhanced damages for willful infringement in 81 percent of all copyright disputes in the examined
period, yet courts awarded enhanced damages in less than 2 percent of all cases that moved to verdict.
The striking gap between the demand and supply of statutory damages, as well as several additional
factors relating to nature of claims and subject-matter areas, undermine the credibility of the nearly
ubiquitous claims of willful infringement by plaintiffs.”); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439,
441 (2009) (finding that “[a]wards of statutory damages are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent,
unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive”).
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of very steep statutory damages in copyright effectively affords a rights
holder an absolute right to exclude—i.e., property rule protection
delivered via a liability regime. For example, an independent filmmaker
may be able to make a case for fair use of a copyrighted work that appears
in her film. If she doesn’t, however, the possibility of statutory damages
in the six figures could end the project altogether. In other words, too high
damages under a liability rule cause it to effectively act like a property
rule, forcing ex ante negotiation.185 Of course, hiring a lawyer is also not
a costless endeavor, and the filmmaker from our example above may be
more likely to simply seek a license;186 i.e., to simply recognize a property
right in, or concomitant right to more protection for or a higher payment
from, the work as the next and final section details.
D.

Perceived Control

The private deals described in Part III indicate a propensity to
recognize stronger protection for copyrighted works than that
contemplated by the statute. A reduction in transaction costs, the lack of
a tailoring in the compulsory license, and the possibility of very high
statutory damages all help to explain why a party might avoid or
circumvent the extant statute. The more difficult thing to explain is why
these circumventions result in super-statutory terms.
One explanation might lie with the improved stability and predictability
that property rule protections lend. A property right puts licensees on
notice that negotiation is required, period. As such, no time and energy
need be spent attempting to discern the allowability or fairness of a
particular use. In addition, once an agreement is reached, both parties have
every incentive to maximize use of the licensed work.
Another plausible impetus for super-statutory contracting is that the
existence of a liability rule default effectively acts as an asset to be
conceded on the part of the licensee. Where a licensee would otherwise
have only cash (or its equivalent) to exchange for the granting of a license,
a compulsory license gives her an additional (and valuable) object of
trade: perceived control, in the form of a stronger liability right, or
property rule protection. Many licensors value control over their work,
and compulsory licenses inarguably diminish (and in some cases,
eliminate) their perceptions of that control (and, indeed, their actual
185. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 761 (1996) (“Under [a] liability rule, we presume damages are set
equal to the . . . owners’ average common value. . . . [W]hen takers expect courts’ estimates of
common value to be too high . . . the result will be close to that achieved under [a] property rule.”).
186. Arguably unnecessarily. For more on the phenomenon of risk-averse users over-licensing IP,
see Gibson, supra note 138, at 885.
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control in many cases). In agreeing not to utilize a compulsory license,
but instead to recognize a licensor’s right to deny use, a licensee returns
the licensor’s perceived control over her work. For example, the “fake
artists” in the Spotify example are still subject to the compulsory license,
should Spotify decide to utilize it. In offering them a negotiated payment,
Spotify allows those artists to perceive more control over the valuation of
their work. In creating Content ID, YouTube gives record labels a
perception of more control over their content—block, monetize,
take-down—than they are afforded under the safe harbor.
Notwithstanding the tenuous nature of this “control” (so long as the
statute operates in the background), it is in some ways more valuable than
cash: it returns the rights holder to the status of partner, rather than
counterparty. Instead of spending time and money preparing lawsuits and
litigating, YouTube and the major content owners worked together to
structure and build Content ID as a means of improving both partners’
businesses. Rather than pouring additional money into the broadcasters’
lobby against a terrestrial performance right, Clear Channel forged a
partnership with Swift and her former label that earned the media
company invaluable exclusives from one of the world’s biggest artists,
who now had a stake in the endeavor’s success.
All of this suggests that perceived control in the intellectual property
context acts as an analog to the right to exclude in the real property
context. This notion comports with empirical work by Jonathan Klick and
Gideon Parchomovsky looking at the value of the right to exclude to real
property owners. Using “right to roam” laws in the UK as a natural
experiment, they determine that “the right to exclude is very valuable to
property owners, and even so-called slight intrusions on owners’
exclusion right in favor of more public access seem to come at a real cost
to owners.”187 Similarly, the examples in Part III above suggest that the
perception of control is very valuable to intellectual property owners, and
the perceived (and actual) deterioration of that control by compulsory
licenses and collective rights organizations has a significant negative
impact on those rights holders. The significance of this perceived (and
actual) loss of control, and the determination of IP owners to regain it, is
reflected in the proliferation of super-statutory contracting.
CONCLUSION
Ayres’s and Talley’s important and novel observation—that liability
rules can induce bargaining just as well as, if not better than, property
187. Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical
Assessment, 165 PA. L. REV. 917, 961 (2017).
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rules—is playing out in copyright law today. Merges’s proposition that
property rules are superior to liability rules in the intellectual property
context due to their propensity to induce the formation of CROs marks
another influential contribution, one informed by an assumption that
transaction costs are prohibitive, and that numerous and dispersed
ownership recommends consolidation of bargaining power. The private
deals presented in this Article reveal that neither of these assumptions
necessarily persist in copyright today. Instead, as copyright law has
increasingly become a liability regime, private agreements in the space
have gone in the other direction, opting out of collectives and adopting
stronger protections than those afforded by law.
This observation contradicts the conventional wisdom that says that
licensors and licensees favor liability rules for their ability to overcome
transaction costs associated with property entitlements, and that if faced
with property entitlements, form CROs with the goal of establishing
liability rules under which they can operate. Instead, the shift toward
super-statutory contracting offers evidence of the diminishing import of
consolidated bargaining power (in a space, like copyright, where the
number of players continues to shrink), and of a substantive and
meaningful reduction in transaction costs, such that they can no longer be
viewed as prohibitive in many cases. The trend away from copyright’s
liability regime also comports with the theory that its compulsory
licenses—owing to poor tailoring and uncertainty—act like penalty
default licenses, thereby pushing parties to engage in private negotiation,
where they can achieve greater efficiency and flexibility.
In this way, super-statutory contracting serves to highlight the
inefficiencies and inadequacies of the extant liability regime. For
example, Content ID’s popularity suggests that participating licensors and
licensees are dissatisfied and/or poorly-served by the statutory safe
harbor. The deal between Big Machine and Clear Channel demonstrates a
willingness on the part of a broadcaster to pay a terrestrial performance
royalty. The withdrawal of digital performance rights from ASCAP by the
major music publishers points to a collective that has failed its
membership. By revealing information about both preferences and
pricing, these examples make positive contributions to the
legislative discourse.
At the same time, super-statutory contracting can undermine public law
values, such as the making available of copyrighted content to
similarly-situated licensees at a common rate. In some cases, the liability
rule may have gotten it “right,” meaning the parties opting out are merely
extracting rents from third parties. The proliferation of super-statutory
contracting in copyright also introduces concerns around holdup, adverse
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selection, and misrepresentation. In making their case in support of
liability over property rules in IP, Lemley and Weiser argue that the
application of an equitable remedy, such as an injunction, in the IP context
can lead to overprotection due to the uncertain scope of many IP rights,
and that “an overprotective injunction—if not ameliorated through a
liability rule—will facilitate holdup strategies and undermine economic
efficiency goals.”188
Similarly, super-statutory contracting in an oligopolistic market like
copyright can suppress the development of a workably competitive
market, and can exacerbate the possibility of adverse selection as more
powerful companies opt for more efficient private deals and leave less
powerful entities to the penalty default license. Where oligopolists are
additionally able to exert influence over a counterparty without
recourse—such as in the case of Pandora and the music publishers’
withdrawal of their digital rights from ASCAP—the risk of establishing a
misrepresentative “market” rate is increased as well. Lawmakers would
do well to recognize the propensity for extensive compulsory licensing,
like that seen in copyright, to induce parties to opt out, thereby revealing
important information about market preferences and pricing.
Perhaps the most striking lesson to be taken from the phenomenon of
super-statutory contracting is the underappreciated role of perceived
control as a key lever in the licensing enterprise. The perception of control
serves as a valuable asset for licensors and as a bargaining chip for
licensees. Importantly, this insight requires the existence of a default
liability rule that transfers control from licensor to licensee, setting the
stage for a private deal that transfers it back.

188. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 15, at 796.
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